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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
A. 
This consolidated appeal encompasses three class 
actions brought in the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(―TCPA‖), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).  The TCPA is a unique 
federal statute that provides a private right of action for 
recipients of unsolicited facsimiles, as well as statutory 
damages of $500 per ―violation.‖  The plaintiffs in these suits 
alleged that each respective defendant sent over 10,000 
unsolicited fax advertisements to plaintiffs at their New York 
or New Jersey offices, and to thousands of others throughout 
the country, in violation of the TCPA.
1
  The plaintiffs in each 
                                                 
1
In each of the cases, the plaintiffs sought to represent three 
classes:  Class A, consisting of all persons in the United 
States to whom defendant sent or caused to be sent a fax 
advertisement without the recipient‘s express invitation or 
permission between four years before the filing of the 
complaint through July 8, 2005; Class B, consisting of all 
persons to whom defendant sent or caused to be sent a fax 
advertisement, which did not contain a notice as required by 
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D), between July 9, 2005 through July 
30, 2006; and Class C, consisting of all persons to whom 
defendant sent or caused to be sent a fax, which did not 
contain a notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iii), 
between August 1, 2006 through the present. 
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case requested more than $5 million in damages for 
themselves and the members of the classes they represented.  
All three cases were dismissed by the District Courts on the 
grounds that plaintiffs‘ claims did not fulfill the requirements 
of diversity jurisdiction.
2
  Although the District Courts‘ 
specific reasons for dismissal varied slightly, a common 
question arises in our review of each of the cases:  whether, 
notwithstanding our ruling in ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, 
                                                 
2
In Landsman & Funk, P.C. v. Skinder-Strauss Associates, 
636 F. Supp. 2d 359 (D.N.J. 2009), the District Court 
dismissed plaintiffs‘ complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of jurisdiction; it 
held that it lacked federal question jurisdiction under ErieNet 
and diversity jurisdiction because, under New York law, 
plaintiffs cannot bring class actions for statutory damages 
and, thus, the plaintiffs here could not satisfy the $5 million 
amount-in-controversy requirement under the Class Action 
Fairness Act (―CAFA‖).  In Goodrich Management Corp. v. 
Afgo Mechanical Services, Inc., No. 09-00043, 2009 WL 
2602200 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2009), the District Court dismissed 
plaintiffs‘ complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6); 
it found that it lacked federal question jurisdiction under 
ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 
1998), and determined that, since plaintiffs could not show 
that they were entitled to Rule 23 class certification, it lacked 
diversity jurisdiction because CAFA‘s amount-in-controversy 
requirement could not be met.  The Goodrich Management 
Corp. v. Flierwire, Inc. Court dismissed the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) based 
entirely on the reasoning in Landsman and Afgo.  No. 08-
5818, 2009 WL 3029758 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2009).   
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Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 1998), that private TCPA claims 
do not present a federal question, the federal courts can 
exercise diversity jurisdiction over private suits brought under 
the TCPA.  On appeal, appellees contend that the three 
District Courts that ruled on the issue of jurisdiction erred 
because none held – as they should have – that there can be 
no diversity jurisdiction over claims under the TCPA.
3
  
Because this argument, if adopted, would be dispositive of all 
three cases – in that dismissal would be appropriate in each 
case if it is correct – we address this issue before considering 
other issues raised as to the propriety of the District Courts‘ 
rulings in each case.   
In ErieNet, we held that Congress intended to divest 
federal courts of federal question jurisdiction over individual 
TCPA claims.  We are now called upon to decide whether our 
reasoning in ErieNet extends to diversity jurisdiction.  That is, 
did Congress intend that these actions should be maintained 
exclusively in state courts such that federal courts cannot 
exercise diversity jurisdiction over them?  We hold here that 
Congress did not intend for exclusive state court jurisdiction.  
The TCPA does not strip federal courts of diversity 
jurisdiction over actions brought under § 227(b)(3).  Given 
                                                 
3Though this is not the focus of appellees‘ argument, it is 
always our duty to assure ourselves of the existence of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  See also Bender v. 
Wiliamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) 
(―[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to 
‗satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of 
the lower courts in a cause under review.‘‖ (internal citations 
omitted)).   
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our ruling that each District Court has jurisdiction over its 
respective plaintiffs‘ private TCPA class action claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), we also must address the 
Courts‘ class certification determinations, as discussed more 
fully below.    
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review 
the District Courts‘ orders dismissing these cases for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  We exercise plenary review of a 
district court‘s § 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
and a district court‘s § 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a 
claim.  McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d 
Cir. 2009); Angelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  We also exercise plenary review of a district 
court‘s resulting jurisdictional determination.  Umland v. 
PLANCO Fin. Serv., 542 F.3d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 2008).  We 
review a decision to certify or deny a class for abuse of 
discretion.  Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
213 F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing In re Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am. Sales Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
B. 
The TCPA, which was passed in 1991 as part of an 
amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, declares it 
unlawful under federal law ―to use any telephone facsimile 
machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone 
facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement,‖ unless 
certain statutory exceptions apply.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).  
It contains distinct provisions for private parties on the one 
hand, and state attorneys general on the other, to enforce this 
prohibition by litigation.  § 227(b)(3), (f).  Section 227(b)(3), 
entitled ―Private right of action,‖ provides that:  
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A person or entity may, if otherwise 
permitted by the laws or rules of court 
of a State, bring in an appropriate court 
of that State—  
(A) an action based on a violation of 
this subsection or the regulations 
prescribed under this subsection 
to enjoin such violation,  
(B) an action to recover for actual 
monetary loss from such a 
violation, or to receive $500 in 
damages for each such violation, 
whichever is greater, or  
(C) both such actions.  
If the court finds that the defendant 
willfully or knowingly violated this 
subsection or the regulations prescribed 
under this subsection, the court may, in 
its discretion, increase the amount of 
the award to an amount equal to not 
more than 3 times the amount available 
under subparagraph (B) of this 
paragraph.  
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  Thus, this private right of action 
allows a person, ―if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules 
of court of a State, [to] bring in an appropriate court of that 
State‖ a private action for damages or injunctive relief, and 
entitles a successful plaintiff to recover damages of at least 
$500 per unsolicited fax.  Another provision, whereby state 
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attorneys general can bring civil actions for damages and 
injunctive relief, provides that the federal courts ―shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction‖ over all such actions.  § 227(f)(1), (2).  
It also provides that the TCPA does not prevent state officials 
from bringing similar actions in state court or otherwise 
exercising their powers under state law.  § 227(f)(5), (6). 
In enacting this legislation, Congress explained that it 
sought ―to facilitate interstate commerce by restricting certain 
uses of facsimile ([f]ax) machines and automatic dialers.‖  S. 
Rep. No. 102-178, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.S.C.A.N. 1968, 1968.  It noted that ―unsolicited calls 
placed to fax machines . . . often impose a cost on the called 
party (fax messages require the called party to pay for the 
paper used . . . ).‖  Id. at 1969.  In addition, a so-called ―junk 
fax‖ ―occupies the recipient‘s facsimile machine so that it is 
unavailable for legitimate business messages while 
processing and printing the junk fax.‖  H.R. Rep. No. 102-
317, at 10 (1991).  Congress also noted the need for federal 
regulation to fill the gaps between individual states‘ 
regulatory efforts, since ―[s]tates do not have the jurisdiction 
to protect their citizens against those who use [automated 
dialing] machines to place interstate telephone calls.‖  S. Rep. 
No. 102-178, at 5.  That is, although ―[m]any States have 
passed laws that seek to regulate telemarketing,‖ 
―telemarketers can easily avoid the restrictions of State law, 
simply by locating their phone centers out of state.‖  H.R. 
Rep. No. 102-317, at 9-1.  This history suggests that Congress 
intended both to ―fill the gaps‖ in state regulation and to give 
consumers the right to file TCPA actions in state court.  The 
TCPA, and its private right of action, were thus designed to 
put ―teeth‖ into state regulation, rather than to establish a 
distinctly federal policy.  Essentially, Congress ―sought to put 
10 
 
the TCPA on the same footing as state law . . . , 
supplementing state law where there were perceived 
jurisdictional gaps.‖  Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 
335, 342 (2d Cir. 2006).    
In introducing the bill, its sponsor, Senator Ernest 
Hollings, described the private right of action as follows: 
The . . . bill contains a private 
right-of-action provision that will 
make it easier for consumers to 
recover damages from receiving 
these computerized calls.  The 
provision would allow consumers 
to bring an action in State court 
against any entity that violates the 
bill.  The bill does not, because of 
constitutional constraints, dictate 
to the States which court in each 
State shall be the proper venue for 
such an action, as this is a matter 
for State legislators to determine.  
Nevertheless, it is my hope that 
States will make it as easy as 
possible for consumers to bring 
such actions, preferably in small 
claims court.  The consumer 
outrage at receiving these calls is 
clear.  Unless Congress makes it 
easier for consumers to obtain 
damages from those who violate 
this bill, these abuses will 
undoubtedly continue. 
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Small claims court or a 
similar court would allow the 
consumer to appear before the 
court without an attorney.  The 
amount of damages in this 
legislation is set to be fair to both 
the consumer and the 
telemarketer.  However, it would 
defeat the purposes of the bill if 
the attorneys‘ costs to consumers 
of bringing an action were greater 
than the potential damages.  I thus 
expect that the States will act 
reasonably in permitting their 
citizens to go to court to enforce 
this bill. 
137 Cong. Rec. S16204 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of 
Sen. Hollings). 
C. 
The TCPA ―presents an unusual constellation of 
statutory features‖:  ―the express creation of a private right of 
action, an express jurisdictional grant to state courts to 
entertain them, and silence as to federal court jurisdiction of 
private actions.‖  Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 
131 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1997).  As noted above, we 
concluded in ErieNet that, based on the language, structure, 
and legislative history of the statute, there is no federal 
question jurisdiction over private actions brought under the 
TCPA.  156 F.3d at 516-19.  In ErieNet, we interpreted the 
permissive language of § 227(b)(3) providing that a person 
―may‖ bring an action in state court to suggest that ―Congress 
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intended to authorize private causes of action only in state 
courts, and to withhold federal [question] jurisdiction.‖  Id. at 
516 (emphasis in original).  We focused on the distinction 
between the general jurisdiction of state courts and the limited 
jurisdiction of federal courts.  See id.  (―[T]here is no 
presumption of jurisdiction in the federal courts.‖).  It was 
significant, we said, that the statute‘s permissive authorization 
referred only to state courts of general jurisdiction; ―‗that 
authorization cannot confer jurisdiction on a federal court 
because federal courts are competent to hear only those cases 
specifically authorized.‘‖  Id. (quoting Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst., 
Inc. v. Inacom Commc’ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1151 (4th Cir. 
1997)).  We noted that subject matter jurisdiction must be 
conferred by statute and that the TCPA did not expressly do 
that.  Id. 
The majority of courts of appeals to consider the 
question have similarly concluded that federal courts lack 
federal question jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.  
Citing § 227(b)(3)‘s explicit authorization of jurisdiction over 
private actions in state courts and the absence of any 
reference to federal court, these courts have concluded that 
Congress did not intend to grant the federal courts federal 
question jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.  See Murphey 
v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 2000); Foxhall Realty 
Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd., 156 
F.3d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1998); Nicholson v. Hooters of 
Augusta, Inc., 135 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998); Chair 
King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 514 (5th 
Cir. 1997); Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Commc’ns, 
Inc.,  106 F.3d 1146, 1156  (4th Cir. 1997).       Only   two 
courts of appeals have held otherwise.  See Charvat v. 
EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 463-65 (6th Cir. 2010) 
13 
 
(finding federal question jurisdiction under the TCPA based 
on § 227(f)(2)‘s explicit provision for exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)‘s authorization of removal 
to federal court unless expressly provided by Congress, and 
on its reading of Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. 
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005)); 
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 450-51 
(7th Cir. 2005) (similarly finding federal question jurisdiction 
under the TCPA based on § 227(f)(2) and Grable).  
Though we addressed federal question jurisdiction 
extensively in ErieNet, we had no occasion to consider 
whether there can be diversity jurisdiction over TCPA 
claims.
4
  156 F.3d at 520.  The issue presently before us is 
                                                 
4
We acknowledge that ErieNet referred, somewhat 
imprecisely, to ―federal court jurisdiction‖ and ―federal 
jurisdiction.‖  However, notwithstanding Judge Garth‘s view, 
our analysis and holding were limited to federal question 
jurisdiction.  Our opinion in ErieNet begins by referring to ―a 
district court‘s federal question jurisdiction‖ and Article III‘s 
authorization of ―arising under‖ (i.e., federal question) 
jurisdiction, and then refers repeatedly to jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  156 F.3d at 515, 518-20.  By contrast, 
neither diversity jurisdiction nor the statute that authorizes it, 
28 U.S.C. § 1332, is mentioned in the opinion at all.  See 
Watson v. NCO Grp., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 641, 646 n.2 (E.D. 
Pa. 2006) (―[O]riginal jurisdiction pursuant to sections 1331 
and 1337 were the only types of jurisdiction at issue in 
ErieNet.  The court did not discuss the effects of its holding 
on supplemental or diversity jurisdiction.‖) (internal citation 
omitted)).  Nor do the other Courts of Appeals cases finding 
that federal courts lack § 1331 jurisdiction under the TCPA 
14 
 
whether diversity jurisdiction exists in the federal courts, 
notwithstanding our conclusion in ErieNet that Congress 
intended for private litigants to seek recourse in state courts 
for TCPA violations.  In ErieNet we asked whether Congress 
conferred subject-matter jurisdiction in the TCPA;
5
 here we 
ask whether Congress intended state courts to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over TCPA claims and, thus, stripped away 
diversity jurisdiction.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
hold that Congress did not divest the federal courts of 
diversity jurisdiction over private causes of action under the 
                                                                                                             
compel the conclusion that they also lack diversity 
jurisdiction.  See Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon 
Wireless Pers. Commc’ns, LP, 294 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839-40 
(M.D. La. 2003) (―Nothing in the reasoning of any of the 
courts‘ [§1331 TCPA] opinions, however, suggests it would 
be logical to extend that reasoning to diversity jurisdiction.‖). 
 
5Our references to ―exclusivity‖ of  jurisdiction and 
jurisdiction ―only‖ in state courts in ErieNet must, as then-
Judge (now Justice) Sotomayor stated about similar 
references in Foxhall, ―be read in context.‖  Gottlieb, 436 
F.3d at 337.  ErieNet addressed only federal question 
jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction, so our references to 
―exclusive‖ state jurisdiction there must be read to describe 
only ―exclusive substance-based jurisdiction‖ over TCPA 
claims in the state courts, not truly exclusive state court 
jurisdiction.  Notwithstanding Judge Garth‘s reference to 
Congress‘s having ―provided‖ and ―decreed‖ that ―all‖ cases 
be brought ―only‖ in state court, the TCPA does not so state.  
(If it did, I would share Judge Garth‘s view on the issue 
before us).    
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TCPA.  Finding that we have diversity jurisdiction over 
TCPA claims does not disturb the concepts we set down in 
ErieNet; the TCPA has neither divested federal courts of 
diversity jurisdiction over private causes of action nor 
conferred on them federal question jurisdiction.
6
   
                                                 
6
Chief Judge McKee takes issue with our opinion in ErieNet, 
urging that three recent Supreme Court opinions have 
undermined the reasoning and result in that case.  ErieNet is a 
precedential opinion of our Court that is not before us on this 
appeal.  Even if it were, however, the Supreme Court cases 
referred to did not involve a federal statute that set forth a 
private right of action for litigants to proceed in state court.  
The statute in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 641 (2002), the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, explicitly provided that an 
action could be brought ―in an appropriate Federal district 
court,‖ and in Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, 538 U.S. 
691 (2003), the statute at issue provided that an action to 
recover liability may be maintained ―‗in any federal or state 
court of competent jurisdiction.‘‖  Id. at 693 (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b)).  Unlike the TCPA, neither statute evinces 
any congressional intent to keep causes of action in state 
court in the absence in diversity.  Neither statute specifically 
directs private rights of action to state court.  Finally, in 
Whitman v. Department of Transportation, 547 U.S. 512 
(2006) (per curiam), the Court noted that the district court, in 
considering the question of whether it has jurisdiction under 5 
U.S.C. § 7121, should look to the statute itself and the overall 
Act in which it appears to discern whether Congress intended 
for jurisdiction to lie elsewhere.  Id. at 513-14.  In Erienet, we 
did exactly that and found that the TCPA removed the 
16 
 
D. 
Here, the specific provision granting subject matter 
jurisdiction to the federal courts is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), an 
amendment added to § 1332 pursuant to the Class Action 
Fairness Act (―CAFA‖) of 2005.  Under CAFA, federal 
courts have original jurisdiction over class actions where 
there is minimal diversity and the aggregate amount in 
controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interests and 
costs.  §1332(d)(2), (6).  In each of these cases, minimal 
diversity is present and, given defendants‘ alleged 
transmission of over 10,000 unsolicited faxes and the 
possibility of treble damages under the TCPA, the aggregate 
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million CAFA requires.  
Thus, in light of our ruling that federal courts can exercise 
diversity jurisdiction over TCPA claims when the 
requirements of diversity are otherwise fulfilled, the New 
Jersey District Courts here had subject-matter jurisdiction 
under § 1332(d).   
In holding that there is diversity jurisdiction under the 
TCPA, we rely heavily on then-Judge (now Justice) 
Sotomayor‘s opinion in Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., where the 
Second Circuit persuasively applied two canons of statutory 
interpretation to the TCPA – the ―whole act rule,‖ which 
instructs that parts of a statute should be placed in the context 
of the entire statutory scheme and the principle that reliance 
on background principles of law inform a statute‘s 
interpretation – to conclude that federal courts should have 
diversity jurisdiction over § 227(b)(3) claims.  436 F.3d at 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction that § 1331 often confers on federally created 
causes of action.  Accordingly, these cases are inapposite.  
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338-343.  Though we do not adopt Gottlieb‘s reasoning 
wholesale, we note the soundness of the Second Circuit‘s 
approach and draw on it considerably.   
Our starting point is the historic grant of diversity 
jurisdiction to the federal courts, first under the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, then as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1332.  As did the 
Gottlieb court, we understand § 1332 as ―an independent 
grant of federal jurisdiction intended to prevent 
discrimination against non-citizen parties regardless of 
whether state or federal substantive law is involved.‖  437 
F.3d at 340.  As such, diversity jurisdiction is ―presumed to 
exist for all causes of action so long as the statutory 
requirements are satisfied.‖  Id.  Indeed, the language of § 
1332 provides that district courts ―shall have jurisdiction of 
all civil actions where‖ the matter in controversy exceeds 
$75,000 and where the parties are diverse.  18 U.S.C. § 1332 
(emphasis added).  Federal courts only lack diversity 
jurisdiction where Congress has explicitly expressed an intent 
to strip federal courts of this jurisdiction, Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 
338, or where such jurisdiction is found to be irreconcilable 
with a congressional statute.  U.S. Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. iHire, 
Inc., 476 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Colo. River 
Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 808 
(1976)).  See also id. at 1117 (―[A]bsent an explicit indication 
that Congress intended to create an exception to diversity 
jurisdiction, one may not be created by implication.‖) (citing 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700 (1992)).   
It is useful to begin with the origins of the two 
traditional bases for subject matter jurisdiction.  Federal 
courts did not have general federal question jurisdiction until 
1875.  Idaho v. Couer d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 
(1997).  Before then, federal courts had jurisdiction over 
18 
 
substantive law claims either when the federal statute sought 
to be enforced contained a specific grant of federal court 
jurisdiction or when diversity of citizenship was present.  
Diversity jurisdiction, by contrast, was ―expressly 
contemplated by Article III of the United States Constitution‖ 
and has provided a jurisdictional basis for entry into the 
federal courts since the very inception of our judicial system 
in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  Kopff v. World Research Grp., 
LLC, 298 F. Supp. 2d 50, 55 (D.D.C. 2003).  See also Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1188 (2010) 
(noting the First Judiciary‘s Act‘s grant of authority to federal 
courts to hear suits ―‗between a citizen of the State where the 
suit is brought, and a citizen of another State‘‖) (quoting § 11, 
1 Stat. 78)).   
 
Today, diversity jurisdiction is ―based on a grant of 
jurisdictional authority from Congress‖ in the form of 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  U.S. Fax Law Ctr., 476 F.3d at 1117 (citing 
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 
171 (1939)).  ―As to diversity cases, Congress has given the 
federal courts cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the 
several states.  [A party‘s] consent [to be sued in the courts of 
a state], therefore, extends to any court sitting in the state 
which applies the laws of the state.‖  Id.  (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  Diversity 
jurisdiction‘s purpose – of ―prevent[ing] apprehended 
discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the 
state,‖ Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) – 
exists independently of other considerations like the subject 
matter of the lawsuit or the nature of the law under which the 
suit is filed.  See Accounting Outsourcing, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 
838 (―[N]o matter how one may label the diversity statute, it 
exists for an independent and important reason, unrelated to 
19 
 
the subject matter of the lawsuit.‖).  Indeed, the 
―presupposition of diversity jurisdiction,‖ a concern with 
local bias, is usually not affected by other aspects of the cause 
of action.  Jerome G. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 546 n.6 (1995).  Consequently, as a 
general matter, where parties are diverse and the amount in 
controversy meets the statutory bar, § 1332 operates as a 
threshold grant of jurisdiction.
7
  Other bases for federal 
jurisdiction may be expressly or impliedly proscribed, but 
such proscriptions are typically responsive to concerns that 
are either irrelevant or outweighed when the requirements for 
diversity jurisdiction are met.    
Courts have long recognized the presumption of 
diversity jurisdiction regardless of the type of law under 
which a lawsuit arises.  In Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 
(1855), for example, plaintiff, a Connecticut citizen and an 
investor in an Ohio corporation, sued, among others, an Ohio 
tax collector who was trying to collect taxes from the 
corporation.  Plaintiff claimed that the taxes, which resulted 
                                                 
7
Perhaps due to the mechanical nature of diversity 
jurisdiction‘s requirements, commentators have noted that, 
even after federal question jurisdiction was codified, litigants 
relied on diversity jurisdiction as a basis for entering federal 
court even where federal question jurisdiction existed.  See 
Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of 
Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 Yale L.J. 77, 85, 
134 (1997) (―In seeking injunctions against taxes alleged to 
violate the Constitution, federal court litigants continued to 
rely heavily on diversity jurisdiction well into th[e] 
[twentieth] century, long after the federal question statute had 
become available.‖). 
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from the passage of a new state law and state constitution in 
Ohio, violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
because they abrogated the terms of the corporate charter the 
corporation had received from Ohio.  Id. at 335-40.  Today, 
this claim would fall squarely under a federal court‘s federal 
question jurisdiction, but the Court‘s emphasis here was on 
the jurisdictional baseline that existed by virtue of the parties‘ 
diversity of citizenship.  The Court rejected defendant‘s 
argument that the suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the state courts and noted ―that the courts of the United States 
and the courts of the States have concurrent jurisdiction in all 
cases between citizens of different States, whatever may be 
the matter in controversy, if it be one for judicial cognizance . 
. . and that it is no objection to this jurisdiction, that there is a 
remedy under the local law.‖  Id. at 347 (emphasis added).  It 
is the parties being from different states, not the subject 
matter, that is determinative.    
The presumptive existence of federal courts‘ diversity 
jurisdiction over all causes of action that meet § 1332‘s 
requirements is bolstered by the ―well-established principle of 
statutory construction that repeal or amendment by 
implication is disfavored.‖  Gottlieb, 436 F.3d 335 (citing 
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 808; Rosencrans v. United States, 
165 U.S. 257, 262 (1897)).  As the Supreme Court has 
emphasized, ―[w]hen there are statutes,‖ like § 1332, ―clearly 
defining the jurisdiction of the courts, the force and effect of 
such provisions should not be disturbed by a mere 
implication.‖  165 U.S. at 262.  See also Kopff, 298 F. Supp. 
2d at 55 (―A federal court‘s original jurisdiction in diversity 
cases is not subject to implied exceptions.‖).  In Colorado 
River, the Supreme Court stated that, ―[i]n the absence of 
some affirmative showing of an intent to repeal, the only 
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permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when 
the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.‖  424 U.S. at 
808.  Clearly, § 227(b)(3) does not evince an intent to repeal 
§ 1332 and is in no way irreconcilable with § 1332.  
Federal question jurisdiction, by contrast, lacks 
diversity jurisdiction‘s expansive nature and straightforward 
applicability.  Where a federal question clearly exists, district 
courts have original jurisdiction unless a specific statute 
places jurisdiction elsewhere, U.S. Fax Law Ctr., 476 F.3d at 
1117 (citing Int’l Sci., 106 F.3d at 1154), and if a federal 
question is not as clearly presented, determining whether 
―arising under‖ jurisdiction exists requires a multi-factorial 
analysis of how federal the claim really is; the process is more 
nuanced than the easily applied two-factor test for diversity 
jurisdiction, and the purposes served by allowing access to 
the federal courts under each statute are quite distinct.  As the 
Fifth Circuit explained in finding that federal courts lack 
federal question jurisdiction under the TCPA, ―[t]here is no 
‗single, precise definition‘ of when a case falls within the 
original ‗federal question‘ jurisdiction of federal courts; 
‗rather, the phrase ―arising under‖ masks a welter of issues 
regarding the interpretation of federal and state authority and 
proper management of the federal jurisdictional system.‘‖  
Chair King, 131 F.3d at 510 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms. 
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (internal citations 
omitted)).
8
  Assessing whether a federal court has diversity 
                                                 
8Indeed, § 1331‘s ―all civil actions arising under‖ language 
has been interpreted to ensure that only cases ―in which a 
well-pleaded complaint establishes either [1] that federal law 
creates the cause of action or [2] that the plaintiff‘s right to 
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial 
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jurisdiction generally avoids such thorny analysis.  Thus, 
collapsing federal question and diversity jurisdiction together 
in the context of the TCPA ignores the meaningful difference 
between federal question jurisdiction, a constrained basis for 
jurisdiction that applies in a ―narrow class‖ of federally-
oriented cases, and diversity jurisdiction, which has 
traditionally been open to claims based on any cause of action 
out of concern for avoiding bias against out-of-state parties.
9
  
                                                                                                             
question of federal law‖ come into federal court under the 
court‘s federal question jurisdiction.  Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983).  The 
federal question statute has not been read to confer upon 
federal courts ―the full breadth‖ of federal question 
jurisdiction but instead has ―been construed more narrowly 
than its constitutional counterpart.‖  Chair King, 1311 F.3d at 
510 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 
480, 494-95 (1983)); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 
358 U.S. 354, 379-80 (1959)).  By contrast, § 1332(a)‘s ―all 
civil actions where‖ language has, in the absence of a specific 
directive otherwise, been interpreted to mean just what it 
says:  when the conditions following ―where‖ – sufficient 
amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship – are met, 
the suit can come into federal court. 
 
9
In Brill, the Seventh Circuit, in dicta, conflated the two 
traditional bases for jurisdiction without explanation or 
citation – ―if state jurisdiction really is ‗exclusive,‘ then it 
knocks out § 1332 as well as § 1331.‖  427 F.3d at 450.  This 
is the only instance where a Court of Appeals, albeit without 
providing any reasoning, has concluded that the existence or 
absence of federal question jurisdiction under the TCPA 
23 
 
Bryan v. BellSouth Commc’n, Inc., 377 F.3d 424, 434 (4th 
Cir. 2004).  
 
Nor does the fact that the TCPA is a federally created 
cause of action compel us to put diversity jurisdiction and 
federal question jurisdiction under the TCPA on equal 
footing.  Though it is indeed ―rare [for a] federal statute . . . 
[to] create[] a cause of action that gives rise to jurisdiction 
under § 1332, but not under § 1331,‖ Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 
342 n.8, it is not logically inconsistent.  First, diversity 
jurisdiction is not by its statutory terms limited to state-law 
claims.  As Judge Sotomayor observed in Gottlieb, ―nothing 
in § 1332 indicates that diversity jurisdiction does not exist 
where federally-created causes of action are concerned.‖  436 
F.3d at 335.
10
  Moreover, in the instances where federal 
                                                                                                             
dictates the same for diversity jurisdiction.  For the reasons 
discussed herein, we reject this conclusion.   
 
10
A federal court‘s exercise of diversity jurisdiction over a 
federally-created cause of action will put the court in the 
―odd‖ position of ―apply[ing] federal substantive and 
procedural law,‖ Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 342 n.8 (emphasis 
added).  This in no way suggests that diversity jurisdiction is 
improper; it merely ―emphasizes the sui generis nature of the 
[TCPA].‖  Id.  The Sixth Circuit has also recognized and 
approved of this departure from Erie‘s directive to apply state 
substantive law and federal procedural law in diversity cases 
– a directive that is only applicable where state law causes of 
action are at issue.  See Charvat v. GVN Mich., Inc., 561 F.3d 
623, 630 n.6 (6th Cir. 2009).  In Charvat, the Sixth Circuit 
rejected the district court‘s application of Ohio law in 
interpreting the federal TCPA and explained that, although 
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statutes do not give rise to § 1331 jurisdiction, there is no 
indication that the rationale behind the absence of federal 
question jurisdiction also wipes out diversity jurisdiction.   
 
  Though the ―vast majority‖ of cases that fall under § 
1331 are ―described by Justice Holmes‘ adage that ‗a suit 
arises under the law that creates the cause of action,‘‖ Merrell 
Dow, 478 U.S. at 819 (quoting Am. Well Works Co v. Layne 
& Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)), it is not the case 
that every private cause of action under a federal statute 
begets federal question jurisdiction.  Rather, ―[i]nferior 
federal courts‘ ‗federal question‘ jurisdiction ultimately 
depends on Congress‘s intent as manifested by the federal 
statute creating the cause of action.‖  Chair King, 131 F.3d at 
510 (citing Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 
(1850)).  See also Int’l Sci., 106 F.3d at 1154 (―Because 
federal-question jurisdiction ultimately depends on an act of 
Congress, the scope of the district courts‘ jurisdiction depends 
on that congressional intent manifested in [the] statute.‖).  
                                                                                                             
federal courts sitting in diversity usually ―apply state 
substantive law to state-law claims, this case presents a very 
different situation, because the statute on which the claims are 
based is itself a federal statute.  As we have noted, ‗the 
applicability of state law depends on the nature of the issue 
before the federal court and not on the basis for its 
jurisdiction.‘‖  Id. (quoting Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. 
Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 333-34 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation omitted)).  Because the issue before it was 
―the interpretation of a federal statute,‖ the Charvat court 
reasoned that it was ―not bound by decisions of the state 
courts of Ohio interpreting the federal TCPA.‖  Id. (citing 
Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 348 n.8). 
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Indeed, as our focus in ErieNet demonstrates, congressional 
intent is a touchstone of federal question jurisdiction analysis.  
See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812  (noting that it has 
―consistently emphasized, in exploring the outer reaches of § 
1331,‖ that the determination of whether federal question 
jurisdiction exists over nonfederal causes of action ―require[s] 
sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial 
power, and the federal system‖).  With diversity jurisdiction, 
however, unless Congress has been explicit in mandating 
exclusive state court jurisdiction or in precluding diversity 
jurisdiction, congressional intent is largely irrelevant to 
determining whether a federal court has diversity jurisdiction 
over a given cause of action.  
 
Suits authorized by the federal statute at issue in 
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900), present 
an example of causes of action which, though created by 
federal law, do not fall under federal courts‘ federal question 
jurisdiction.  In Shoshone, the Court considered whether a 
federal statute expressly authorizing ―adverse suits‖ to 
determine title to land established federal question 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 506.  The statute provided that claims were 
to be determined ―by local customs or rules of miners in the 
several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and 
not inconsistent with the laws of the United States; or by the 
statute of limitations for mining claims of the State or 
Territory where the same may be situated.‖  Id. at 508.  The 
mere fact that a suit ―takes its origin in the laws of the United 
States‖ does not, the Court reasoned, necessarily make it ―one 
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States,‖ 
lest virtually every dispute over title to land ―in the newer 
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States‖ raise a federal question.  Id. at 507.11  Accordingly, 
the Court held that the federal cause of action created by the 
mining statute did not confer federal question jurisdiction 
over claims that turned entirely on state law.  Id.   
 
However, in noting the ―conceded fact that, unless the 
amount in controversy is over $2,000, no jurisdiction attaches 
to the Federal court,‖ id. at 511, the Court suggested that 
federal courts could exercise diversity jurisdiction over claims 
brought under the mining statute.  Indeed, in International 
Science, the Fourth Circuit pointed to Shoshone as an 
example of a case where the Court found that, 
―notwithstanding the federal statutory basis, Congress 
intended that because of the predominance of state issues that 
cases be litigated in state courts unless there was diversity of 
citizenship.‖  106 F.3d at 1154 (emphasis added).  Even in 
Shoshone, where the statute at issue dealt with subject matter 
of the most local variety, land title, and specifically required 
the application of local laws and rules,
12
 it was not interpreted 
                                                 
11
See also Shultis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912) (―A 
suit to enforce a right which takes its origins in the laws of the 
United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one 
arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it 
really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy 
respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a law, 
upon the determination of which the result depends.‖). 
 
12
Granted, the mining statute did not refer to the venue in 
which suits should or may be brought, whereas the TCPA 
specifically states that causes of action ―may be brought‖ in 
―an appropriate court of that state.‖  27 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  
 
27 
 
to create exclusive state court jurisdiction.  The Shoshone 
Court‘s justification for removing certain federally created 
causes of action from federal courts‘ § 1331 jurisdiction 
where state law issues dominate or state rules govern does not 
apply to diversity jurisdiction, which, as we have described, 
―derives its basis not on the presence of a federal question, 
but rather on an independent anti-discrimination rationale.‖  
Biggerstaff v. Voice Power Telecomms., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 
652, 657 (D.S.C. 2002).
13
  Both the mining statute and the 
                                                 
13
Similarly, in Bay Shore Union Free School District v. Kain, 
485 F.3d 730, 733-36 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit 
found that federal courts did not have federal question 
jurisdiction over claims under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) where those claims turned 
entirely on state law and where diversity of citizenship was 
absent.  IDEA required school districts to provide 
individualized education programs for disabled 
schoolchildren and provided that parties ―aggrieved by‖ the 
state or local agency‘s review of those programs ―shall have 
the right to bring a civil action‖ challenging the agency‘s 
decision ―in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a 
district court of the United States.‖  Id. at 735 (quoting 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).  The Second Circuit found that, 
despite the reference in IDEA‘s jurisdictional provision to 
―district courts,‖ district courts lacked § 1331 jurisdiction 
over IDEA claims where the resolution turned entirely on 
state law, like the school district‘s challenge here to the local 
education agency‘s determination that the district was obliged 
to provide a student with a one-to-one aide during class.  A 
federal court, Bay Shore said, ―may not exercise jurisdiction 
over a civil action brought under § 1415(i)(2)(A) if the claims 
asserted turn exclusively on matters of state law and diversity 
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TCPA are examples of federal causes of action that 
essentially enable state enforcement; as such, neither confers 
federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts, but neither, 
without more, disrupts the baseline framework of federal 
diversity jurisdiction over large claims between diverse 
parties.
14
     
 
E. 
 
With this understanding of diversity jurisdiction in 
mind, we turn now to the TCPA itself.  Due to the nature of 
diversity jurisdiction, it would take a ―clear and definitive‖ 
                                                                                                             
of citizenship is absent.‖  Id. at 736 (emphasis added).  As in 
Shoshone, the court‘s conclusion regarding federal courts‘ 
lack of § 1331 jurisdiction under a federally created cause of 
action did not bear on the independent question of whether 
federal courts could have diversity jurisdiction under the 
statute.   
 
14Plaintiffs‘ claims under the mining statute in Shoshone and 
IDEA in Bay Shore turned entirely on the interpretation of 
state law.  By contrast, the sources of law applicable in 
adjudicating TCPA claims are not so clearly limited, thus 
complicating our § 1331 jurisdictional inquiry – i.e. 
Shoshone‘s exception to the rule that ―a suit arises under the 
law that creates the cause of action‖ does not squarely apply 
to private causes of action under the TCPA.  The presumption 
of diversity jurisdiction in both cases despite the state-law 
focus of the mining and IDEA statutes, however, underscores 
both diversity jurisdiction‘s independence from the § 1331 
inquiry and its baseline presence where it has not been 
explicitly divested. 
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directive from Congress to persuade us ―to remove a party‘s 
entitlement to a federal forum based on diversity.‖  
Accounting Outsourcing, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 838.  As the 
Second Circuit did, we ―proceed according to the rule that § 
1332 applies to all causes of action, whether created by state 
or federal law, unless Congress expresses a clear intent to the 
contrary.‖  Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 340.  Our demand for a clear 
statement comports with our general view that ―‗repeals by 
implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless 
the intention of the legislature is clear and manifest.‘‖  Hagan 
v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Nat’l 
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 
644 (2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).   
 
We do not find the TCPA‘s language sufficiently clear 
or forceful enough to deprive federal courts of diversity 
jurisdiction over TCPA claims.  Nothing in § 227(b)(3) or the 
overall statute indicates that Congress intended for individual 
claims brought under the TCPA to operate any differently 
than other suits between diverse parties where the amount in 
controversy meets § 1332‘s requirements.  
   
First, § 227(b)(3) itself, which states that ―[a] person or 
entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of 
court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State‖ an 
action for damages against defendants who have violated the 
TCPA, does not expressly remove federal courts‘ diversity 
jurisdiction over TCPA claims.  As the Tenth Circuit has 
noted, ―[t]his fact alone is probably sufficient to demonstrate 
the presence of diversity jurisdiction because ‗[diversity 
jurisdiction] is an independent grant of federal jurisdiction . . . 
[that] is presumed to exist for all causes of action so long as 
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statutory requirements are satisfied.‘‖  U.S. Fax Law Ctr., 476 
F.3d at 1117 (quoting Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 340).
15
   
                                                 
15
We note, as Gottlieb did, the contrast between the absence 
of any reference to diversity jurisdiction in the TCPA and the 
overt elimination of such jurisdiction in at least two other 
federal statutes.  See 436 F.3d at 340 n.6.  The Johnson Act 
states:  
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain 
the operation of, or compliance with, any order 
affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made 
by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body 
of a State political subdivision, where:  (1) Jurisdiction 
is based solely on diversity of citizenship or 
repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; 
and, (2) The order does not interfere with interstate 
commerce; and, (3) The order has been made after 
reasonable notice and hearing; and, (4) A plain, speedy 
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such 
State.   
28 U.S.C. § 1342 (emphasis added).  In the Johnson Act, 
Congress made explicit its intention to preclude subject 
matter jurisdiction based on diversity.  In addition, the 
legislative history of the Act makes it plain that Congress‘s 
purpose in passing the Act was to ―prevent out-of state 
utilities from challenging state administrative orders in 
federal court,‖ Accounting Outsourcing, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 
839 (citing California v. Grace, 457 U.S. 393, 410 n.22), a 
purpose that aligns with divesting the federal courts of 
diversity jurisdiction.   
The Tax Injunction Act provides:  
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain 
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under 
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Moreover, the statute‘s ―permissive grant of 
jurisdiction to state courts,‖ ErieNet, 156 F.3d at 523 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) – its provision that litigants ―may‖ bring 
private actions in state courts – does not indicate that suits are 
required to be brought in state court; it suggests only that, as 
                                                                                                             
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy 
may be had in the courts of such State.  
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added).  Though the text of the 
TIA does not specifically address diversity jurisdiction, the 
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to ―stop 
out-of-state corporations from using diversity jurisdiction to 
gain injunctive relief against a state tax in federal court . . . .‖  
Jefferson County, Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 435 (1999).  
Both the Johnson Act and the TIA ―were designed to 
eliminate disparities between taxpayers who could obtain 
injunctive relief in federal court – namely out-of-state 
corporations asserting diversity jurisdiction – and local 
taxpayers who were left to litigate in state courts where 
taxpayers often had to pay first and litigate later.‖  Accounting 
Outsourcing, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 839.  In these contexts, the 
usual justification for diversity jurisdiction – preventing 
discrimination against out-of-state defendants – is absent; in 
fact, Congress wished to address the converse concern – 
eliminating any preference for out-of-state defendants.  With 
the TCPA, Congress has evinced no such countervailing 
concern.  Neither the TCPA‘s text nor legislative history 
suggests any reason for barring federal subject matter 
jurisdiction where the parties are diverse and the amount in 
controversy meets the jurisdictional bar.  
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the text says, they may be brought in state courts.
16
  As we 
observed in ErieNet, Congress, with this permissive language, 
―referred . . . [TCPA] claims to state court as forcefully as it 
could‖ given possible constitutional difficulties with 
mandating a resort to state courts.  156 F.3d at 516 (emphasis 
added).  We found Congress‘s direction emphatic enough and 
adequately indicative of a lack of federal concern to remove 
federal courts‘ § 1331 jurisdiction over TCPA claims.  The 
direction, however, is not the kind of precise, unambiguous 
statement of congressional intent to confer exclusive state 
court jurisdiction that is required to divest a court of its 
diversity jurisdiction.  The language in the Johnson Act and 
the TIA, see supra n.15, demonstrates that when Congress 
wishes to strip federal courts of diversity jurisdiction, it does 
so clearly, and usually in a context where the policy concerns 
underlying diversity jurisdiction are absent.  In these 
instances, a congressional directive to strip courts of diversity 
jurisdiction need not be inferred from statutory text and 
legislative history that speak more directly to questions of 
federal interest, state/federal balance and other barometers of 
federal question jurisdiction; instead, the abrogation is clearly 
stated.  
 
The TCPA‘s statutory structure further supports our 
interpretation.  See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 
F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that, in statutory 
construction, ―[m]eaning derives from context‖).  Courts of 
                                                 
16
See ErieNet, 156 F.3d at 522 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the TCPA was designed to ―‗allow consumers to bring an 
action in state court.‘‖)  (quoting 137 Cong. Rec. S16205 
(daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991)) . 
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appeals addressing federal question jurisdiction under the 
TCPA have pointed out that Congress‘s drawing of 
jurisdictional distinctions in other parts of the TCPA made its 
failure to do so in § 227(b)(3) more significant.  The Second 
Circuit in Foxhall and the Fourth Circuit in International 
Science cited § 227(f)(2)‘s explicit mandate that federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over TCPA claims brought 
by states‘ attorneys17 as evidence that where Congress 
affirmatively intended for federal court jurisdiction, it so 
stated.  In addition, as Gottlieb recognized, § 227(f)(2)‘s 
exclusive jurisdiction language further suggests that 
Congress, in the very same act, knew how to explicitly assign 
exclusive jurisdiction to one set of courts.  Thus, when in § 
227(b)(3) it ―did not similarly vest categorical, ‗exclusive‘ 
jurisdiction in state courts for private TCPA claims,‖ it 
therefore ―did not divest federal courts of both federal 
question and diversity jurisdiction.‖  Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 338 
(emphasis added).  Regarding the overall statutory structure, 
the Second Circuit concluded, and we agree, that ―[j]ust as 
nothing in the language of § 227(b)(3) expresses a 
congressional intent to divest the federal courts of jurisdiction 
under the TCPA, nothing in the statutory structure indicates 
that intent.‖  Id. at 339.   
 
Our interpretation is also consistent with the TCPA‘s 
statutory purposes, as revealed in the statute‘s legislative 
history.  See Klein v. Vision Lab Telecomm., Inc., 399 F. 
Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (―This interpretation [that 
                                                 
17Section 227(f)(2) provides, in relevant part, that ―[t]he 
district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all civil actions brought under this 
subsection.‖  47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(2).  
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federal courts have § 1332 jurisdiction under the TCPA] is 
consistent with the purposes of the TCPA, as reflected in the 
Act‘s legislative history.‖).  In reading the TCPA to exclude 
federal question jurisdiction, several courts of appeals have 
looked to Senator Hollings‘s suggestion that ―state courts 
provide a more appropriate forum for small value claims and 
plaintiffs appearing on their own behalf.‖  Accounting 
Outsourcing, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (citing Int’l Sci., 106 
F.3d at 1152-53 (internal citations omitted)).  See also, e.g., 
ErieNet, 156 F.3d at 518 (citing the congressional record and 
Senator Hollings‘s statement); Int’l Sci, 106 F.3d at 1152-53 
(same).  Congress‘s preference for resolving small TCPA 
claims in state courts designed to handle them, significant to § 
1331 analysis, has little relevance and ―little force in a 
diversity suit, which by definition involves an amount in 
controversy exceeding $75,000.‖  U.S. Fax Law Ctr., 476 
F.3d at 1117 (citing Accounting Outsourcing, 294 F. Supp. 2d 
at 840).  As then-Judge (now Justice) Alito noted in his 
ErieNet dissent, ―the Senator said nothing about preventing 
corporate adversaries who are battling over large sums of 
money from . . . go[ing] to federal court.‖  156 F.3d at 522.18  
Nothing in the Senator‘s statements contradicts or even 
speaks to the basic rationale underlying diversity jurisdiction 
                                                 
18
Judge Alito, who argued that federal courts do have federal 
question jurisdiction under the TCPA, suggested that such 
battling corporate adversaries could choose to go to federal 
court, even in the absence of diversity.  We disagree with his 
overall conclusion but concur with his reading of the statute‘s 
legislative history – that it ―confirm[s] the permissive grant of 
state jurisdiction found in the statute‘s text‖ and does not 
indicate that Congress intended for exclusive state 
jurisdiction.  156 F.3d at 522.     
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– protecting out-of-state defendants from pro-citizen bias in 
the state courts.  Indeed, our holding that federal courts have 
diversity jurisdiction over TCPA claims where § 1332‘s 
conditions are met – for the same protectionist reasons they 
always have diversity jurisdiction over larger claims between 
diverse parties – in no way conflicts with Congress‘s wish 
that individual low-value claims regarding unsolicited faxes 
be litigated in state courts.
19
   
 
As we have explained, nothing in the statutory text or 
legislative history of the TCPA expressly indicates that 
Congress intended to strip federal courts of their diversity 
                                                 
19In examining the TCPA‘s statutory purpose, we also note 
what Congress clearly was not contemplating or targeting 
with passage of the TCPA.  Private suits under the TCPA do 
not fall into the narrow ambit of causes of action over which 
state courts have exclusive jurisdiction even if the 
requirements of diversity are met.  Cf. Colo. River, 424 U.S. 
at 817 (noting the ―virtually unflagging obligation of the 
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them‖).  
These suits concern domestic relations – divorce, alimony, 
and child custody – and are confined to the state courts 
because of their highly localized nature and because of the 
primacy of states‘ interest in these matters.  The TCPA, by 
contrast, does not regulate an area of the law characterized by 
deep-seated historical deference to state courts and state 
policy.  Cf. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704 (―[S]tate courts are 
more eminently suited to work of this type than are federal 
courts, which lack the close association with state and local 
government organizations dedicated to handling issues that 
arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody 
decrees.‖).  
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jurisdiction under § 1332 over TCPA claims.  Since diversity 
jurisdiction is not explicitly abrogated, it will only be found 
lacking if the ―diversity jurisdiction statute and the TCPA are 
‗irreconcilable.‘‖  U.S. Fax Law Ctr., 476 F.3d at 1117 (citing 
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 808).  See also Hagan, 570 F.3d at 
155 (―‗An implied repeal will only be found where provisions 
in two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, or where the 
latter act covers the whole subject area of the earlier one and 
is clearly intended as a substitute.‘‖) (quoting Branch v. 
Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted)).   
 
The diversity jurisdiction statute and the TCPA are not 
irreconcilable.  Though federally established, the TCPA 
essentially operates like a state law.  By providing a federal 
law to counteract evasion of state law across state lines, 
Congress ―sought to put the TCPA on the same footing as 
state law, essentially supplementing state law where there 
were perceived jurisdictional gaps.‖  Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 
342.  In ErieNet, we noted that the ―mere need for federal 
legislation and provision of remedies does not give a right of 
access to a federal forum,‖ 156 F.3d at 517;20 nor does a 
                                                 
20
Though the interstitial role of the TCPA does not suggest a 
clearly identifiable federal interest that would provide a basis 
for federal question jurisdiction, the TCPA‘s text and history 
also do not reflect the kind of clearly exclusive, localized 
concerns that are at the heart of domestic relations statutes or 
statutes like the TIA and the Johnson Act, see supra, which 
do not allow for diversity jurisdiction.  See Accounting 
Outsourcing, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (―Unlike matters 
involving taxes and public utilities, matters involving fax 
transmission can hardly be deemed ‗traditionally regulated‘ 
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federal law‘s gap-filling function or its operation alongside 
state law remove the action from federal court entirely.  We 
agree with the Second Circuit that, ―[i]nsofar as Congress 
sought, via the TCPA, to enact the functional equivalent of 
state law that was beyond the jurisdiction of a state to enact, it 
would be odd to conclude that Congress intended that statute 
to be treated differently, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, 
than any other state statute.‖  436 F.3d at 342.   
 
Not only are the TCPA and the diversity statute 
compatible, but it is actually the ―eliminat[ion] [of] diversity 
jurisdiction over TCPA claims‖ that would produce 
anomalous results.  U.S. Fax Law Ctr., 476 F.3d at 1117 
(emphasis in original).  Indeed, interpreting the TCPA to vest 
exclusive jurisdiction in state courts would mean that ―‗state 
law claims based on unlawful telephone calls could be 
brought in federal court, while federal TCPA claims based on 
those same calls could be heard only in state court.‘‖  Id. 
(quoting Kinder v. Citibank, No. 99-CV-2500, 2000 WL 
1409762, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000)).  See also Gottlieb, 
436 F.3d at 342 (―The reasoning of those district courts that 
have noted the anomaly that would result if a plaintiff 
alleging a state-law cause of action for unauthorized 
telemarketing could sue in federal court on the basis of 
diversity jurisdiction but a TCPA plaintiff could not do so is . 
. . persuasive.‖) (citing Kinder, 2000 WL 1409762, at *4).  
Bifurcating related cases would ―promote a needless waste of 
resources through duplicative discovery and motion practice, 
and would create the possibility of conflicting factual findings 
                                                                                                             
by the states.‖).  It is thus coherent to conclude that the TCPA 
produces neither federal question jurisdiction nor exclusive 
state court jurisdiction.   
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and legal holdings.‖  Watson, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 646.  In 
addition, finding exclusive state court jurisdiction under the 
TCPA would bar the federal courts from exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over TCPA 
claims:  ―[W]here a federal court exercised federal question 
jurisdiction over a claim involving other provisions of the 
Communications Act or diversity jurisdiction over a claim 
under a parallel state statute, it could not hear a related TCPA 
claim.‖  436 F.3d at 342.  Without a clear statement from 
Congress precluding the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction 
over TCPA claims we are unwilling to so interfere with this 
established and independent basis of jurisdiction.  See  
Watson, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (―To interpret ErieNet to 
foreclose supplemental jurisdiction would produce a result 
that is unsupported by the language and the intent of the 
TCPA, and is inconsistent with the purpose of supplemental 
jurisdiction.‖). 
 
Other impermissible consequences could also flow 
from the elimination of diversity jurisdiction.  We note the 
possibility that, in the absence of diversity jurisdiction under 
§ 1332, a plaintiff who had received unsolicited faxes could 
entirely lose his right to file a private TCPA claim.  The 
language in the TCPA providing that a plaintiff may bring 
suit in state court ―if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules 
of a State‖ suggests that, without diversity jurisdiction in 
federal courts, a plaintiff ―could be without any venue to file 
his claim if a state opted out of the TCPA.‖  U.S. Fax Law 
Ctr., 476 F.3d at 1117 (―‗[I]f otherwise permitted by the laws 
or rules of a court of a State‘ implies that federal [question or 
diversity] jurisdiction . . . is available; otherwise where would 
victims go if a state elected not to entertain these suits?‖) 
(citing Brill, 427 F.3d at 751)).   
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Finally, we recognize that, on a practical level, 
Congress probably did not anticipate a circumstance in which 
a conflict between § 1332 and § 227(b)(3) would arise.  
Indeed, Congress set the statutory damages for individual 
TCPA claims at $500, a figure substantially lower than the 
$75,000 diversity jurisdiction bar.  We have little doubt that 
in designing a statute to provide relief to aggrieved recipients 
of unsolicited faxes, Congress expected that these individuals 
would sue in state court and did not want federal court to be 
bothered with their claims.  However, as the Second Circuit 
concluded, ―Congress‘s failure to foresee a circumstance in 
which diversity jurisdiction could be invoked does not serve 
as a barrier to federal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear 
statement to divest the federal courts of diversity 
jurisdiction.‖  Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 343.21  Congress has 
given no indication that when litigants can aggregate their 
claims to add up to $75,000, or file as a class to reach 
CAFA‘s $5 million requirement, it intended that these claims 
be barred from federal court.
22
  Its failure to anticipate this 
                                                 
21
See also Charvat, 630 F.3d at 464 (interpreting § 227(b)(3) 
to ―suggest that Congress anticipated that the Act would be 
privately enforced primarily in state court‖ but concluding 
that this does not ―establish that such claims may proceed 
only in state court – that state court jurisdiction is exclusive‖).   
 
22
The availability under § 227(f) of a cause of action brought 
by the state in federal court on behalf of its citizens does not 
act as a substitute for these aggregated claims; firstly, a 
parens patriae case brought by a state under § 227(f) does not 
provide the individual compensation provided for by § 
227(b)(3)‘s private cause of action and, secondly, as we noted 
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circumstance does not signal or predict its intent now that the 
circumstance has arisen.  To conclude otherwise is to enter 
the realm of speculation.  We would prefer to let Congress 
speak for itself.  As it stands, the TCPA does not direct us to 
treat diversity jurisdiction any differently than we normally 
would, and the litigants present no argument for why we 
should disrupt the standard premise that a federal forum is 
available for completely diverse parties where the amount in 
controversy is $75,000 or more and for minimally diverse 
parties where the amount is $5 million or more. 
 
In holding that we have diversity jurisdiction over 
individual TCPA claims, we join a majority of courts of 
appeals and district courts that have considered or addressed 
the issue.  See Gottlieb, 436 F.3d 335; U.S. Fax Law Ctr., 476 
F.3d at 1117 (following Gottlieb in concluding that, ―absent 
an explicit indication that Congress intended to create an 
exception to diversity jurisdiction, one may not be created by 
implication‖ and finding no such explicit indication in the 
TCPA); Gene & Gene LLC v. Biopay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 
324-25 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding without specific analysis 
of the diversity jurisdiction question that, because the 
requirements of CAFA were met, it has diversity jurisdiction 
over aggregated CAFA claims:  ―[Regardless of federal 
question jurisdiction,] subject-matter jurisdiction, in any 
event, is proper under provisions of CAFA.‖); Klein, 399 F. 
Supp. 2d at 533-34; Watson, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 647; Kopff, 
298 F. Supp. 2d at 55; Charvat, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 739 n.1; 
                                                                                                             
in ErieNet, ―the sheer number of calls made each day-more 
than 18,000,000-would make it impossible for government 
entities alone to completely or effectively supervise this 
activity.‖  156 F.3d at 515.  
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Accounting Outsourcing, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 839-40.  We 
conclude that neither the TCPA itself nor our decision in 
ErieNet precludes district courts from hearing TCPA claims 
where an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, like 
diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, exists.  Federal 
question and diversity are distinct jurisdictional bases; at least 
in the context of the TCPA, the existence or non-existence of 
one jurisdictional basis does not affect the existence of the 
other.  As we read the TCPA, there is nothing in the statute 
itself – or suggested by its legislative history – that provides a 
basis for federal jurisdiction and, at the same time, there is 
nothing in it that deprives federal courts from hearing TCPA 
claims where independent grounds for jurisdiction exist.  A 
federal cause of action that gives rise to § 1332, but not § 
1331, jurisdiction is indeed rare, Gottlieb, 346 F.3d at 342 n. 
8, but it would defy congressional intent as expressed in the 
TCPA‘s text and statutory scheme not to endorse this unique 
jurisdictional framework.  
F. 
 The Landsman District Court did not base its dismissal 
on the unavailability of diversity jurisdiction over private 
TCPA claims.  It correctly noted that there could be diversity 
jurisdiction under the TCPA, largely based on its 
understanding that our ruling in ErieNet was confined to 
federal question jurisdiction.
23
  However, the District Court 
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Landsman also acknowledged that plaintiffs satisfied the 
three basic requirements of § 1332(d):  that the class have at 
least 100 members, that there exist minimal diversity between 
the parties (Landsman is a New York citizen, and Skinder-
Strauss a New Jersey citizen), and that the amount in 
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then went on to examine state law, deeming state law ―with 
respect to the TCPA‖ to be ―substantive‖ under Erie and 
conducting a choice-of-law analysis between New York and 
New Jersey law.
24
  See Erie, 304 U.S. 64.  The Court 
appeared to believe that Erie controlled – and required a 
choice-of-law analysis – since the issue before the court in a 
diversity case necessarily involves a choice among state laws.  
The Court reached the conclusion that New York law would 
apply, and because New York does not permit class claims 
seeking aggregated statutory damages,
25
 plaintiffs could not 
                                                                                                             
controversy be at least $5 million (the complaint alleged that 
defendant sent over 10,000 faxes, and the damages for each 
fax are $500).   
 
24
Citing our decision in Chin v. Chrysler LLC, 538 F.3d 272, 
278 (3d Cir. 2008), the Landsman Court decided that, in 
diversity cases, it must first determine whether a ―matter‖ is 
procedural or substantive; substantive ―matters‖ require a 
choice-of-law analysis.  Concluding that ―no law could be 
more substantive than‖ CPLR § 901(b), since it ―would 
foreclose the possibility of this Court having jurisdiction,‖ 
636 F. Supp. 2d at 364, it performed a choice-of-law analysis 
to decide whether the substantive law of New Jersey or New 
York should apply.  
 
25New York‘s Civil Practice Law and Rules (―CPLR‖) 
§ 901(b) states the following: 
Unless a statute creating or imposing a 
penalty, or a minimum measure of 
recovery specifically authorizes the 
recovery thereof in a class action, an 
action to recover a penalty, or minimum 
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possibly have damages that would satisfy the $5 million 
amount-in-controversy requirement under CAFA.  
Accordingly, the District Court found that it could not 
exercise diversity jurisdiction over the case and granted 
defendant‘s motion to dismiss.   
 We conclude that the Landsman Court‘s reasoning 
missed the mark.  Because plaintiffs were proceeding under 
federal, not state, law – namely, the federal TCPA – there was 
no need for choice-of-law analysis under Erie.
26
  
Furthermore, even if the fact that the TCPA is a federal 
statute were not determinative, under Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Ass’n, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., --- U.S. ---, 
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), federal law regarding class actions 
would be applied in federal courts, not state law.  Rule 23, not 
§ 901(b), controls this TCPA class action, and plaintiff is thus 
authorized to maintain a class action as long as Rule 23‘s 
                                                                                                             
measure of recovery created or imposed 
by statute may not be maintained as a 
class action.   
C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (emphasis added).  
 
26
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (―Except in matters governed by 
the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be 
applied in any case is the law of the state.‖) (emphasis 
added); supra n.10 (noting that Erie‘s directive to apply state 
substantive law and federal procedural law in diversity cases 
is only applicable where state law causes of action are at 
issue).  
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prerequisites are met.
27
  The Landsman District Court and the 
Flierware District Court, which adopted Landsman‘s 
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In Shady Grove, the Supreme Court held that § 901(b) 
―cannot apply in diversity suits‖ in federal court; rather, Rule 
23 controls.  130 S. Ct. at 1437.  The only exception is when 
Congress has explicitly ―carved out . . . federal claims . . . 
from Rule 23‘s reach,‖ id. at 1428, which is not the case here.  
Indeed, we do not interpret § 227(b)(3)‘s ―if otherwise 
permitted by laws or rules of court of a State‖ language to 
carve out TCPA claims from Rule 23‘s ambit; we agree with 
Justice Scalia that reading § 227(b)(3) to require deference to 
state class action law would mean that the TCPA ―effect[ed] 
an implied partial repeal of the Rules Enabling Act,‖ and 
―would require federal courts to enforce any prerequisite to 
suit state law makes mandatory—a state rule limiting the 
length of the complaint, for example.‖  Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 
130 S. Ct. 1575, 1575-76 (2010) (Mem. granting petition for 
writ of certiorari, vacating judgment and remanding to the 
Second Circuit) (Scalia, J., concurring).  ―A more probable‖ 
reading of this language ―is that when a State closes its doors 
to claims under the Act § 227(b)(3) requires federal courts in 
the State to do so as well.‖  Id. at 1576.  This language deals 
with the threshold requirement of where and when TCPA 
suits can be brought.  It basically authorizes a state to keep 
these claims out of state court, see Brill, 427 F.3d at 451; Int’l 
Sci., 105 F.3d at 1156, but it does not explicitly require the 
application of state law or direct federal courts to defer to 
state law in deciding whether a class action can be 
maintained.  Such a clear statement from Congress would be 
needed for TCPA claims to fall under the exception 
articulated in Shady Grove.  Further, the Shady Grove 
plurality objected to treating § 901(b) as a substantive law, 
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reasoning on this point, erred in finding that New York‘s § 
901(b) applies here to preclude a TCPA class action.  Since 
plaintiffs have met § 1332(d)‘s requirements, the District 
Courts can exercise diversity jurisdiction over their claims.  
The only remaining question, then, is whether Rule 23 was 
satisfied. 
G. 
 The Afgo District Court took a different tack than the 
Landsman Court, but we also disagree with its approach.  As 
was the case in Landsman, the Afgo court presumed the case 
could proceed based on diversity, but reasoned that if a class 
could not be certified, then § 1332(d)‘s amount in controversy 
could not be met.  Accordingly, the Court set forth Rule 23‘s 
class certification requirements and determined that they were 
not fulfilled here.
28
  As we have noted, see supra, Rule 23 
                                                                                                             
since ―it is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose 
of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or 
procedural nature of the Federal Rule.‖  Id. at 1444.  Because 
Rule 23 ―regulates procedure,‖ ―it is authorized by [the Rules 
Enabling Act] and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to 
all claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-
created rights.‖  Id.  
 
28
Rule 23(a) requires that a plaintiff seeking class certification 
must establish four requirements:  numerosity, commonality, 
typicality and adequacy of representation.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a).  In addition, plaintiffs must meet one of the 
requirements of Rule 23(b).  Rule 23(b) requires that one of 
the following conditions is met:  
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(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against 
individual class members would create a risk of:  
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with 
respect to individual class members that would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct for 
the party opposing the class; or  
(B) adjudications with respect to individual 
class members that, as a practical matter, would 
be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the individual 
adjudications or would substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests;  
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that 
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or  
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that 
a class action is superior to other available methods for 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to these findings include:  
(A) the class members' interests in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions;  
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation 
concerning the controversy already begun by or 
against class members;  
(C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; and  
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does apply here.  However, delving into the propriety of class 
certification was the wrong focus at that early stage of the 
proceeding.    
 The Afgo Court held that, even with additional 
discovery, plaintiffs would not be able to fulfill Rule 
23(a)(3)‘s typicality requirement or any of Rule 23(b)‘s 
requirements.
29
  Regarding both typicality and predominance, 
it explained that there were too many ―crucial factual 
determinations to be made with respect to claims and 
defenses that will vary from party to party,‖ in particular, 
consent to receive faxes and the existence of a prior business 
relationship with defendant.  2009 WL 2602200, at *5.  With 
respect to Rule 23(b)(1), the Court concluded that the claims 
of all potential plaintiffs were factually distinct enough that 
there would be no risk of inconsistent adjudications.  Id.  
Finally, it concluded that a class action was not a superior 
means of adjudicating this kind of controversy because the 
                                                                                                             
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class 
action.   
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).  Goodrich alleged in its complaint that 
it meets Rule 23(b)(3)‘s predominance and superiority 
requirements, under which a plaintiff must show that 
―questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate‖ over questions affecting only individual 
members and that a class action is ―superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).   
 
29
The Flierware Court did not conduct an independent 
analysis on the class certification question; it wholly adopted 
Afgo‘s reasoning on this point.    
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individual recovery scheme contemplated by the TCPA – 
which allows individuals to recover $500 to $1500 per 
violation when their actual losses from receiving unwanted 
faxes are slight by comparison – already contains a punitive 
element that both deters potential violators and motivates 
individuals to file claims.  Id.  In fact, the Afgo Court 
reasoned, a class action would be an inferior means; an 
individual plaintiff who could have received damages quickly 
and without attorney‘s fees on her own would instead have to 
engage in protracted litigation and incur substantial legal fees 
that would reduce her recovery.  Id.  
Afgo‘s class certification analysis – and Flierware‘s 
adoption of it – are conclusory at best.30  When the District 
Courts decided the class certification issue, there had been no 
motion for class certification and no discovery; whether the 
class could potentially fit within Rule 23 was determined on a 
motion to dismiss.  This ruling was premature.  To determine 
if the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied, a district 
court must conduct a ―rigorous analysis.‖  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 
2008).  In doing so, a ―court may ‗delve beyond the pleadings 
to determine whether the requirements for class certification 
are satisfied.‘‖  Id. at 316 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 
2001)).  Particularly when a court considers predominance, it 
                                                 
30
We note at the outset our agreement with plaintiff 
Landsman that this case is not among the rare few where the 
complaint itself demonstrates that the requirements for 
maintaining a class action cannot be met.  See Rios v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 740 (S.D. Iowa 
2007). 
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may have to venture into the territory of a claim‘s merits and 
evaluate the nature of the evidence.  Id. at 310-11.  In most 
cases, some level of discovery is essential to such an 
evaluation.  In Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d 
Cir. 2004), we emphasized the importance of discovery as 
part of the class certification process.  ―It seems appropriate,‖ 
we said, ―that the class action process should be able to ‗play 
out‘ according to the directives of Rule 23 and should permit 
due deliberation by the parties and the court on the class 
certification issues.‖  Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347-48 (footnote 
omitted).  Accordingly, ―[a]llowing time for limited discovery 
supporting certification motions may . . . be necessary for 
sound judicial administration.‖  Id. at 347 n.17.  These 
concerns were the basis for setting down a ―rigorous analysis‖ 
requirement in Hydrogen Peroxide, where we recognized that 
changes in Rule 23 reflected the need ―for a thorough 
evaluation of the Rule 23 factors.‖  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 318.  
Further, in the specific context of claims filed under 
the TCPA statute, it is difficult to resolve without discovery 
whether there are factual issues regarding class members‘ 
business relationships with defendants or whether they 
consented to the receipt of faxes.  See Gene & Gene LLC v. 
BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 327-28 (5th Cir. 2008) (in 
discussing issues of commonality regarding consent, noting 
that ―there are no invariable rules regarding the suitability of 
a particular case filed under [§ 227(b)(3)] of the TCPA for 
class treatment; the unique facts of each case generally will 
determine whether certification is proper‖).  Without 
discovery, the ―unique facts‖ of this case, or any other, will 
not really be exposed.  As the Fifth Circuit noted, differences 
among plaintiffs‘ consent may be defeated by common proof 
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developed in discovery.  See id. at 327-28 (noting the 
possibility of presenting a ―novel, class-wide means of 
establishing . . . lack of consent‖ on discovery – where the 
common question was whether inclusion of the recipients‘ fax 
numbers in a purchased database indicated their consent to 
receive faxes).   The parties should have the opportunity to 
develop the record on this issue.  
Furthermore, we believe that the Afgo Court‘s 
reasoning on many of the aspects of how the class might or 
might not pass muster under Rule 23 were conclusory and 
subject to debate.  First, it is not clear that, as a matter of law, 
differences regarding consent are sufficient to defeat class 
certification.  In Hinman v. M & M Rental Center, Inc., 545 
F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ill. 2008), the district court rejected the 
defendant‘s argument that considerations of consent and 
receipt of faxes are individualized questions so as to defeat 
class certification and noted that ―commonality and typicality 
are generally met where, as here, a defendant engages in a 
standardized course of conduct vis-à-vis the class members, 
and plaintiffs‘ alleged injury arises out of the conduct.‖  545 
F. Supp. 2d at 806-07 (citing Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 
594 (7th Cir. 1998)).  The defendant had argued that, because 
the TCPA applies only to unsolicited faxes, individual 
analysis is required to determine whether each class member 
consented to transmission of the faxes in question.  The court 
nonetheless found that the class members met Rule 23‘s 
commonality requirement.  It pointed out that the defendant‘s 
fax broadcasts were transmitted en masse based on a ―leads‖ 
list compiled several years earlier and that, under these 
circumstances, the consent question could be understood as a 
common question.  ―The possibility that some of the 
individuals on the list may separately have consented to the 
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transmissions at issue is an insufficient basis for denying 
certification.‖  Id. at 807.  But see Forman v. Data Transfer, 
Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying 
certification of TCPA claim based on ―inherently 
individualized‖ question of consent). 
Second, the Afgo Court stated that a class action would 
not be a superior method of handling claims under the TCPA.  
We are not so sure this is correct.
31
  The Afgo Court‘s 
suggestion that the individual statutory damages of $500 to 
$1500 are enough to both punish offenders and spur victims 
substitutes its judgment for that of Congress and makes 
unmerited presumptions regarding deterrence and the 
motivation to litigate.  Had Congress wanted to preclude 
aggregation of individual TCPA claims, it could have so 
provided in the TCPA itself or in CAFA, which specifically 
lists certain types of statutory claims that could not be 
brought as class actions.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  CAFA lists 
various other statutes, but not the TCPA.  Moreover, although 
nuisance faxes are not the most egregious of wrongs policed 
by Congress, the District Court was speculating when it 
assumed that individual suits would deter large commercial 
entities as effectively as aggregated class actions and that 
individuals would be as motivated – or even more motivated 
– to sue in the absence of the class action vehicle.  The 
District Court should not have dismissed out of hand the 
possibility that a class action could provide a superior method 
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The Afgo Court also states, without citation, that New Jersey 
law would govern the substantive aspects of a TCPA case 
brought under a federal court‘s diversity jurisdiction and that 
New Jersey would not permit class actions in a case such as 
this.  As we noted above, this is neither relevant nor correct.   
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of ―fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,‖ as 
required by Rule 23(b)(3).  Although individual actions under 
the TCPA may be easier to bring in small claims court than 
other types of cases, that does not necessarily undermine the 
greater efficiency of adjudicating disputes involving 10,000 
faxes as a single class action.  Indeed, as plaintiffs point out, 
we have little reason to believe that individual actions are 
automatically efficient; plaintiffs can still face protracted 
litigation when they sue individually.  
Finally, where common issues certainly exist, a district 
court might consider subclassing in lieu of decertification.  
The Hinman court, for example, noted the viability of 
defining the class to include only individuals who did not 
consent.  ―[B]y certifying a class of individuals who received 
unsolicited faxes,‖ the court explained, it was ―‗merely 
setting the boundaries of the class‘ not resolving the 
substantive issues.‘‖  Hinman, 545 F. Supp. at 807 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   See Chiang v. 
Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2004) (rather than 
decertifying a class, choosing the ―less drastic course‖ of 
―simply modify[ing] the class definition‖); Simer v. Rios, 661 
F.2d 655, 672 n.29 (7th Cir. 1981) (―[Decertification] ignores 
the possibility of subclassing, a viable alternative in resolving 
such problems.‖).   
Discovery is necessary for the district court to conduct 
the ―rigorous analysis‖ it is tasked with at this stage, and 
more than speculation and supposition is needed to say that 
any vehicle is really superior.  A more robust record must be 
developed here as to the precise nature of the class claims.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the orders of the District Court 
53 
 
dismissing these three cases and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Landsman & Funk, P.C. v. Skinder-Strauss Associates et 
al. 
Nos. 09-3105, 09-3532 & 09-3793 
McKEE, C.J., concurring: 
 The lead opinion persuasively explains why federal 
courts have diversity jurisdiction over claims arising from the 
private cause of action created under the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), and 
it relies on our prior decision in ErieNet v. Velocity Net Inc., 
156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 1998), to explain why the same is not 
true for federal question jurisdiction. I write separately 
because, although I agree that we have diversity jurisdiction 
to decide § 227(b) claims, I believe the very same rationale 
that leads to that result should lead us to conclude that we 
also have federal question jurisdiction over TCPA claims. See 
Lead Op. 28-41.  
 
 The ErieNet majority concluded that we do not have 
federal question jurisdiction over the private cause of action 
in § 227(b).  Our former colleague, now-Justice Alito,
1
 
dissented.  He argued that the text of the TCPA is insufficient 
to support the conclusion that Congress intended to deprive us 
of the federal question jurisdiction over the TCPA‟s private 
cause of action that we would otherwise have pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. He explained: 
 
[S]ection 227(b)(3) says nothing 
about the jurisdiction of the 
federal district courts; instead, it 
says merely that an action under 
that provision “may” be brought 
in an appropriate state court “if 
otherwise permitted by the laws 
or rules of a court of” that state.  
More than this . . .  is needed to 
                                              
1
  Inasmuch as he wrote his dissent in ErieNet while a member of 
this court, I will refer to Justice Alito as “Judge Alito” throughout 
my discussion of his analysis in ErieNet.  
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divest a federal district court of its 
jurisdiction under section 1331. 
 ErieNet, 156 F.3d at 521 (Alito, J., dissenting).   
Judge Alito believed that the ErieNet majority erred by 
focusing on whether the text of the TCPA reflected an intent 
to allow federal courts to exercise federal question 
jurisdiction over suits brought under that statute.  He reasoned 
that the proper inquiry must start with the preexisting grant of 
federal question jurisdiction in § 1331 and then proceed to an 
examination of the pertinent text of the TCPA.  Then, and 
only then, can we determine if that text is sufficiently explicit 
to negate the longstanding grant of jurisdiction contained in § 
1331.   
 
The Supreme Court has since vindicated Judge Alito‟s 
analytical approach.  The Court has clarified that the 
jurisdictional inquiry must begin and end by examining 
whether the statutory text at issue is sufficient to reflect 
Congress‟s intent to abrogate § 1331‟s broad grant of federal 
question jurisdiction.  The inquiry cannot begin by focusing 
on whether the Act in question confers federal jurisdiction.  
The lead opinion here notes that in ErieNet, “[w]e noted that 
subject matter jurisdiction must be conferred by statute and 
that the TCPA did not expressly do that.” Lead Op. at 12.  I 
agree that the TCPA does not confer jurisdiction.  However, 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 clearly does.  
 
Today, we adopt Judge Alito‟s approach in inquiring 
into our diversity jurisdiction, but we leave ErieNet‟s holding 
as to federal question jurisdiction in place. The lead opinion 
reminds us that, “[i]n ErieNet we asked whether Congress 
conferred subject-matter jurisdiction in the TCPA; here we 
ask whether Congress intended state courts to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over TCPA claims and, thus, stripped away 
diversity jurisdiction.”  See Lead Op. at 14.   
 
I see no way we can ask that latter question when 
inquiring into our diversity jurisdiction while asking a very 
different question when inquiring into federal question 
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jurisdiction. The issue remains the same, subject matter 
jurisdiction, and the same question should be asked regarding 
federal question jurisdiction that we are asking about our 
diversity jurisdiction.   
 
When the ErieNet majority posed the jurisdictional 
question there, it did not have the advantage of several 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions that undermine the 
majority‟s analysis.  We now have the benefit of those 
decisions and they undermine the holding of ErieNet. 
A. 
 Since ErieNet, the Supreme Court has decided three 
cases that illuminate the appropriate inquiry for determining 
when federal courts have jurisdiction.  
 
In Verizon Md., Inc. v. PSC, 535 U.S. 635 (2002), the 
Supreme Court held that the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (the “TCA”) did not remove federal question 
jurisdiction conferred under § 1331.  A provision of the TCA 
required internet service providers (“ISPs”) to enter into 
reciprocal compensation agreements by which their networks 
were open to competing ISPs.  The regulatory scheme 
required state utility commissions to approve the terms of the 
agreements and contemplated that the agreements would 
require compensation being paid for non local or out-of-
network calls. However, an issue arose over whether a new 
entrant into the market (WorldCom) had to pay reciprocal 
compensation to Verizon for local telephone calls that 
Verizon‟s customers placed to access the internet.  Verizon 
claimed that WorldCom had to pay compensation because 
calls that connected a local customer to the internet were not 
“local” calls under the TCA.  WorldCom disputed Verizon‟s 
claim and filed a complaint with the state utilities commission 
claiming that it was not obligated to compensate Verizon 
because the disputed calls were “nonlocal for purposes of 
reciprocal compensation,” Id. at 640, and therefore not 
subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement between the 
two ISPs.  The state commission ruled in favor of WorldCom 
and ordered Verizon to pay WorldCom the reciprocal 
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compensation owed under its reciprocal compensation 
agreement with Verizon.   
 
Thereafter, Verizon brought an action in district court 
against the state commission, WorldCom, and other 
telecommunications carriers, arguing that the state 
commission‟s ruling that it must pay reciprocal compensation 
to World Com violated the TCA and a ruling of the FCC.
2
   
Verizon cited 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as 
the basis of the court‟s jurisdiction.   
 
Section 252(e)(6) of the TCA provides in part:  “[i]n 
any case in which a State commission makes a determination 
under this section, any party aggrieved . . . may bring an 
action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine 
whether the agreement . . meets the requirements of . . . this 
[Act].” 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).   However, Verizon‟s suit 
involved “neither the approval or disapproval of a[n 
agreement] nor the approval or disapproval of . . . terms.” Id. 
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the case for lack of 
federal jurisdiction, and a divided Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed.   
 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding “even if § 
252(e)(6) does not confer jurisdiction, it at least does not 
divest the district courts of their authority under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 to review the Commission's order for compliance with 
federal law.”  Id. at 642 (emphasis in original).   The Court 
began its analysis by determining that “Verizon‟s claim [of 
federal preemption] . . . falls within 28 U.S.C. § 1331‟s 
general grant of jurisdiction . . . .”  Id. at 643.  It then 
determined that “nothing in 47 U.S.C. § 252 (e)(6) purports to 
strip this jurisdiction.” Id.  Rather, the Court found that § 
252(e)(6) “merely makes some other actions by state 
commissions reviewable in federal court.  This is not enough 
to eliminate jurisdiction under § 1331.”  Id. (emphasis in 
                                              
2
  The FCC had ruled that the disputed calls were nonlocal “for 
purposes of reciprocal compensation but concluded that, absent a 
federal compensation mechanism for those calls state commissions 
could construe interconnection agreements as requiring 
compensation.” Id. at 640 
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original).  The Court also found “none of the other provisions 
of the Act evince any intent to preclude federal review of a 
commission determination.  If anything, they reinforce the 
conclusion that § 252(e)(6)’s silence on the subject leaves the 
jurisdictional grant of § 1331 untouched.” Id. at 644 
(emphasis added). 
 The Court‟s decision in Bruer v. Jim’s Concrete of 
Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691 (2003), is even more to the point.  
There, Bruer sued his former employer, Jim‟s Concrete, under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.  A section of that Act 
states that a suit under the Act “may be maintain[ed] . . . in 
any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.” 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b).  Bruer originally filed the case in state court, 
but Jim‟s Concrete attempted to remove the case to federal 
court.  Bruer objected, arguing that the Act‟s provision that 
the suit “may be . . . maintain[ed] . . . in any federal or State 
court” deprived federal courts of removal jurisdiction. 
  
 A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
removal was improper under the text of the statute. The Court 
again began by assuming federal removal jurisdiction existed 
and noting that “[n]othing on the face of [29 U.S.C.] § 216(b) 
looks like an express prohibition of removal [jurisdiction] . . . 
.” Bruer, 538 U.S. at 694.  It noted that Congress‟s use of 
“maintain” was ambiguous and the fact that Congress stated 
that an action under the Act could be maintained in either 
federal or state court was therefore not sufficient to 
unambiguously establish congressional intent to divest federal 
removal jurisdiction.  See id. at 695-96.   
  
 Most recently, in Whitman v. Dept. of Transportation, 
547 U.S. 512 (2006), the Supreme Court, in a per curium 
opinion, explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeal‟s approach to determining whether federal courts 
have jurisdiction over cases arising from the Civil Service 
Reform Act (“CSRA”).  The Court noted that “[t]he Court of 
Appeals was correct in concluding that 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) 
does not confer jurisdiction.” However, that fact was not 
determinative because “[a]nother statute, . . . - a very familiar 
one - grants jurisdiction to the federal courts over „all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
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United States.‟” Id. at 513-514 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).  
The Court continued: “The question, then, is not whether 5 
U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) confers jurisdiction, but whether 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7121 (or the CSRA as a whole) removes the jurisdiction 
given to the federal courts.” Id. (citing Verizon Md., Inc., 535 
U.S at 642).   
 
Although these cases do not directly overturn ErieNet, 
they do clearly explain that our jurisdictional inquiry must 
begin with the general grant of federal jurisdiction found in 
Title 28 and then proceed to determining whether Congress 
has used language sufficiently specific to express an intent to 
divest federal courts of that pre-existing jurisdiction.   
B. 
In examining our diversity jurisdiction here, the lead 
opinion quite correctly notes, “Here, the specific provision 
granting subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts is 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d) . . . .”  Lead Op. at 16.   It then proceeds to 
find that “[f]ederal courts only lack diversity jurisdiction 
where Congress has explicitly expressed an intent to strip 
federal courts of this jurisdiction . . . or where such 
jurisdiction is found to be irreconcilable with a congressional 
statute . . . .” Id.  (citations omitted).3  Then, because the lead 
opinion finds that the TCPA is completely silent on the issue 
of federal jurisdiction, it quite correctly concludes that 
diversity jurisdiction must exist.  I agree. 
 
                                              
3
 Judge Garth relies on statements of Senator Hollings to 
support his conclusion that Congress intended TCPA claims 
to be brought only in state courts.  See Dissent at 4 & n2.  I 
believe that the statements made by the bill‟s sponsor were 
best addressed by Judge Alto in his dissent in ErieNet.  See 
ErieNet, 156 F.3d at 522 (“I do not believe that one speech 
given by one senator is sufficient to demonstrate the 
'unmistakable' intent of Congress. Moreover, even if  Senator 
Hollings‟s statement were given controlling weight, it merely 
indicates that the TCPA was designed to „allow consumers to 
bring an action in State court.‟” (emphasis in original). 
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However, I depart from the lead opinion‟s decision to 
reaffirm the holding of ErieNet.  The lead opinion concludes 
that the TCPA is one of those “rare” congressional acts that 
deprives federal courts of federal question jurisdiction but not 
federal diversity jurisdiction.  Lead Op. at 23. (citing Gottlieb, 
436 F.3d at 342 n.8).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently 
noted that federally created causes of actions that do not 
result in federal question jurisdiction are “extremely rare,” 
citing a more than 110-year-old case as an example. Grable & 
Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 
U.S. 308, 317 n.5, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2370 n.5 (2005) (citing 
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 20 S.Ct. 726 
(1900)).
4
   
 
In justifying its differing analysis here and reaffirming 
the holding in ErieNet, the lead opinion attempts to 
distinguish federal question jurisdiction from diversity 
jurisdiction by insisting that “as our focus in ErieNet 
demonstrates, congressional intent is a touchstone of federal 
question jurisdiction analysis.” Lead Op. at 25.  Indeed it is, 
but it is the touchstone for determining both our diversity 
jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction.   
 
                                              
4
 Shoshone was a 1900 suit involving disputed title to a mine. 177 
U.S. 505. The Court held that there was no federal question 
jurisdiction even though the suit in support of an adverse claim to a 
mine arose out of a federal statute. The Court reasoned that 
Congress designed the federal system in such a way that “the great 
bulk of litigation respecting rights to property, although those 
rights may  . . . go back to some law of the United States, is in fact 
carried on in the courts of the several states.” Id. at 507.   
 
However, suits under the TCPA do not involve the kind of 
local interests that have historically been left to the states. Rather, 
the TCPA is an attempt to regulate an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce. As the lead opinion notes, the legislative history of that 
Act refers to “the need for federal regulation to fill the gaps 
between individual states‟ regulatory efforts, since [s]tates do not 
have the jurisdiction to protect their citizens against those who use 
[automated dialing] machines to place interstate telephone calls.” 
Lead Op. at 9 (quoting S. Re. No. 102-178, at 5) (internal 
quotation marks omitted, brackets in original).  
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The real reason that the lead opinion finds that we 
have diversity jurisdiction here while preserving ErieNet‟s 
conclusion that we lack subject matter jurisdiction is its 
analysis of diversity jurisdiction rests upon a very different 
foundation than the ErieNet conclusion regarding federal 
question jurisdiction.  Here, the lead opinion correctly asks 
whether the TCPA abrogates jurisdiction already conferred by 
§ 1332, yet it preserves ErieNet, which improperly asked 
whether the TCPA confers jurisdiction itself, ignoring the 
grant of jurisdiction under § 1331.  The opposing analytical 
approaches are outcome determinative, just as Judge Alito 
suggested in his ErieNet dissent. See 156 F.3d at 521-22.  
Moreover, “„[i]t is true . . . of journeys in the law that the 
place you reach depends on the direction you are taking.  And 
so, where one comes out on a case depends on where one 
goes in.‟” United States v. Sigal, 341 F.2d 837, 844 & n.24 
(3d Cir. 1965) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 
56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)).   
 
If we begin our analysis at the correct starting point, 
we would come out exactly where Judge Alito argued that we 
should in his ErieNet dissent. The private right of action 
under the TCPA unquestionably falls within § 1331‟s general 
grant of federal question jurisdiction.  There is nothing in the 
TCPA that purports to strip that jurisdiction away, and the 
lead opinion here alludes to nothing that would accomplish 
that result.  As the ErieNet majority recognized, neither the 
text of the statute nor the legislative history of the TCPA 
refers to federal courts at all.  156 F.3d at 516.   This 
complete absence of expression simply cannot be woven into 
the clear expression of congressional intent required to 
entirely remove federal jurisdiction.   See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 
644.   
C. 
I am not alone in concluding that intervening Supreme 
Court decisions have undermined ErieNet‟s analytical 
framework. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
noted that ErieNet and other decisions in the other Courts of 
Appeals that have found that federal courts do not have 
jurisdiction over cases involving the TCPA, “cannot be 
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reconciled with” recent Supreme Court decisions, including 
Bruer.  Brill, 427 F.3d at 450.   
 
More recently, in Charvat v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 
630 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2010),  the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit reversed its previous stance that there was no 
federal question jurisdiction under the TCPA, and concluded 
that intervening Supreme Court decisions undermined its 
previous analysis.  The court noted that Congress had 
elsewhere in the TCPA created “exclusive federal jurisdiction 
over Telephone Act claims brought by state attorneys 
general.” 630 F.3d at 464 (citing 47 U.S.C.§ 227(F)(2)).  The 
court reasoned that Congress therefore clearly knew how to 
use language that would create exclusive jurisdiction in a 
given forum, yet it had not otherwise done so.  Rather, 
Congress had merely stated that the private cause of action 
created in § 227 could be brought in state courts.
5
 The court 
examined provisions of the statute that permit suits to be 
brought in state courts and concluded that they were not 
sufficient to divest federal question jurisdiction: “These 
provisions may suggest that Congress anticipated that the Act 
would be privately enforced primarily in state court. But they 
do not establish that such claims may proceed only in state 
court—that state court jurisdiction is exclusive.  Otherwise, 
the Act would preclude even federal—diversity jurisdiction.” 
Id. at 464 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332).  
 
Conclusion 
 
                                              
5
  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Garth reasons that 
Congress's use of “may” in the TCPA simply reflects the fact 
that “a litigant is not required to bring an action, but if he 
chooses to do so, he must comply with certain requirements.” 
Dissent at 10.  However, no aggrieved party is ever required 
to bring a lawsuit, and I am therefore not convinced that the 
permissive wording of the TCPA can be explained as Judge 
Garth suggests. I do not believe that Congress thought it 
necessary to tell aggrieved parties that they need not bring a 
lawsuit unless they want to.  
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Today, we correctly hold that the TCPA does not 
preclude diversity jurisdiction.  However, by allowing our 
decision in ErieNet to stand, we create two anomalies: First, 
we create an anomaly in our subject matter jurisdiction 
jurisprudence by using different analyses when determining 
whether there is diversity jurisdiction and federal question 
jurisdiction.  Second, we create a situation whereby 
individual plaintiffs can bring a claim under a federally 
created cause of action in federal court only when the 
requirements of diversity jurisdiction are satisfied, but 
plaintiffs who cannot satisfy those requirements must sue 
under a federal statute in state court.  
 
I believe that our analysis with regard to diversity 
jurisdiction is equally applicable to federal question 
jurisdiction.  We should have used this opportunity to correct 
the mistake we make in our analysis in ErieNet, and I regret 
that we are not taking this opportunity to say so. 
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Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Associates et al. 
Nos. 09-3105, 09-3532 & 09-3793 
       
GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 The sole issue on this appeal is whether the Federal 
courts have jurisdiction to hear claims asserted under the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227.  My 
colleagues claim they do.  Because I would hold the District 
Courts‟ judgments lacked any source of jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs‟ claims -- either federal-question jurisdiction (28 
U.S.C. § 1331) or diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) -- 
I am obliged to dissent from Judge Rendell‟s opinion, and I 
disagree with Chief Judge McKee‟s separate opinion.1  I 
would affirm the dismissal of the complaint in each of the 
three cases under review. 
 
I. 
 
 The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) 
prohibits certain uses of telephone equipment.  In particular, it 
prohibits the use of any device to send an unsolicited 
advertisement in the form of a fax, except under certain 
circumstances to a recipient with whom the sender has an 
established business relationship.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).  
The TCPA creates a private right of action for persons 
aggrieved by statutory violations.  In relevant part, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(3) reads: 
 
A person or entity may, if 
otherwise permitted by the laws 
or rules of court of a State, bring 
in an appropriate court of that 
                                              
 
1
  Judge Rendell believes there is no federal-question § 
1331 jurisdiction, but there is diversity § 1332 jurisdiction. 
 Chief Judge McKee would hold that there is both 
federal-question § 1331 jurisdiction and diversity § 1332 
jurisdiction. 
 I would hold that there is no federal-question § 1331 
jurisdiction, nor is there diversity § 1332 jurisdiction. 
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State [a private claim under the 
TCPA].  
 
(Emphasis added.)  Recipients of faxes sent in violation of the 
TCPA are entitled to an injunction against further violations, 
and to damages equal to an amount of the greater of their 
actual losses or $500 for each violation.  Id. § 227(b)(3). 
 
 I emphasize at the outset our obligation to interpret 
specific and unambiguous provisions of a statute in a manner 
consistent with their plain meaning.  United States v. Ron 
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); Lawrence v. City 
of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 316–17 (3d Cir. 2008).  In 
construing the meaning of a statute, we are required to look 
first to the statute‟s plain meaning, Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. 
Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2009), as evidenced by 
“„the ordinary meaning of the words used,‟” United States v. 
Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States 
v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008)).  We have been 
instructed to begin with the text of a provision and, if its 
meaning is clear, end there. 
 
 It is therefore clear to me that where Congress 
deliberately has designated the “courts of that State” as the 
forum for all claims of TCPA violations, we have no 
alternative but to comply with that dictate and hold that 
Federal courts may not entertain such claims, either by virtue 
of  federal-question § 1331 jurisdiction, see ErieNet, Inc. v. 
Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 1998), or by virtue 
of diversity § 1332 jurisdiction. 
 
II. 
 
A.     ErieNet remains viable as a precedent. 
 
 In September 1998, my colleague Judge Rendell and I 
constituted a majority of this court‟s panel holding that 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, which endows the district courts with 
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” did not 
permit Federal courts to hear TCPA claims.  ErieNet, 156 
F.3d 513.  Although acknowledging that “Congress could 
have more clearly expressed its intent in the TCPA to decline 
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to provide jurisdiction for these consumer suits in district 
court,” we held:  “To find federal court jurisdiction here 
would not only be contrary to the clear intent of Congress, but 
also would represent a departure from well-established 
principles reflecting a reluctance to find federal jurisdiction 
unless it is clearly provided for.”  Id. at 519. 
 
 In an earlier portion of that opinion, where we 
concluded that the TCPA did not itself confer jurisdiction on 
Federal courts, we examined the text of § 227(b)(3).  We 
reasoned that “[t]he permissive authorization of jurisdiction in 
state courts does not imply that jurisdiction is also authorized 
in federal courts,” and concluded that the fora for such claims 
were exclusively the state courts, because “the most natural 
reading of this language is that Congress intended to 
authorize private causes of action only in state courts, and to 
withhold federal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 516-17.   
 
 We also were influenced by the statement of the 
TCPA‟s chief legislative sponsor, Senator Hollings,2 which 
reflected an intent that TCPA claims be brought in state court, 
id. at 515, and for an obvious reason – the penalty for 
violating TCPA was $500, far below the $75,000 amount 
which must be disputed to invoke a Federal court‟s diversity 
jurisdiction.  We recognized that the remedy sought by a 
consumer would be brought in a State‟s small claims court.  
Finally, we observed that some other sections of the statute 
expressly provided for concurrent jurisdiction in the Federal 
courts, and suggested that the absence of a similar provision 
in § 227(b)(3) was “significant.”  Id. at 517. 
 
 ErieNet thus held that § 1331 does not confer Federal 
jurisdiction over TCPA claims on the Federal courts, and has 
not since been overruled.  And although Judge Rendell‟s 
opinion tries to explain away ErieNet by noting that the 
ErieNet parties only sought federal-question jurisdiction, it 
cannot ignore the unequivocal language of our opinion and 
holding.  ErieNet categorically discounted all forms of 
Federal jurisdiction.  We emphatically stated:  
 
                                              
 
2
  Sen. Hollings‟s statement is neither questioned nor 
contradicted by any other Senator‟s. 
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 “Congress intended that private enforcement suits 
under the TCPA be brought in state, and not federal, 
courts.”  Id. at 516. 
 
 “The most natural reading [of § 227(b)(3)] is that 
Congress intended to authorize private causes of action 
only in state courts, and to withhold federal 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 517. 
 
  “„[T]he clear thrust of [Senator Hollings‟] statement 
was consistent with the bill‟s text that state courts were 
the intended fora for private TCPA actions.‟”  Id. 
(quoting Int‟l Sci. & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom 
Commc‟ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1153 (4th Cir. 1997)).   
 
 “[T]he explicit reference to state courts, and the 
absence of any reference to federal courts, reflects 
Congress‟ intent to withhold jurisdiction over such 
consumer suits in federal court.”  Id.  
 
  “To find federal jurisdiction here would not only be 
contrary to the clear intent of Congress, but would also 
represent a departure from well-established principles 
reflecting a reluctance to find federal jurisdiction 
unless it is clearly provided for.” Id. at 519.  
 
 “[T]he TCPA reflects Congress‟ intent to authorize 
consumer suits in state courts only . . . .”  Id. 
 
 “Congress intended to refer private litigants under the 
TCPA to state court . . . .”  Id. at 520.  
 
It must be emphasized that by holding that there was 
no Federal jurisdiction, we were not referring to federal-
question § 1331 jurisdiction alone, but we were referring to 
Federal jurisdiction as a whole.  That whole includes diversity 
§ 1332 jurisdiction. 
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III. 
The Federal Courts Have No Diversity Jurisdiction Over 
TCPA Claims 
 
 Judge Rendell now seeks to explain away our ErieNet 
opinion and to limit its reach, its reasoning, and its carefully 
chosen language to apply to just federal-question jurisdiction.  
In doing so, Judge Rendell‟s opinion now disclaims its all-
inclusive doctrine of jurisdiction despite our Court having 
approved the ErieNet opinion on circulation.  ErieNet was 
circulated to our entire Court pursuant to our internal 
procedures, and was approved by the entire Court, other than 
the dissenting Judge in ErieNet.
3
  Under our principles, 
standards, and culture, unless an opinion of our Court is 
overruled either by the Supreme Court or by an en banc of 
our Court, it remains as a steadfast precedent and binds all 
subsequent panels, including this panel.  See 3d Cir. Internal 
Operating P. 9.1.  As a consequence, with no Federal 
jurisdiction available to adjudicate their claims, appellants 
have now argued that diversity § 1332 jurisdiction permits the 
Federal courts to hear their claims under the TCPA. 
 
 I respectfully disagree.   
 
A. Federal Courts Cannot Presume Jurisdiction Unless 
Congress Has Granted It.  
 
 As a court of limited jurisdiction, we do not presume 
jurisdiction where it has not been otherwise divested, but 
rather, may only entertain a case if Congress given us 
jurisdiction to hear it.  Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212-
13 (2007); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 
U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 
689, 697-98 (1992) ) (citing, among other cases, Cary v. 
Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845); Bender v. Williamsport Area 
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (citing Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173-180 (1803)); Owen Equip. & 
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978); Kline v. 
Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Sheldon v. 
Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1850); United States ex rel. 
                                              
 
3
  A petition for rehearing was denied by the Court.  
No Judge other than Judge Alito voted for rehearing. 
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Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84, 88 (3d 
Cir. 1969).  That fundament of our jurisdiction rings as true 
today at it did in 1799, when the Supreme Court held that “[a] 
circuit court . . . is of limited jurisdiction . . . [a]nd the fair 
presumption is (not as with regard to a court of general 
jurisdiction unless the contrary appears, but rather) that a 
cause is without its jurisdiction, until the contrary appears.”  
Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. 8, 10 (1799).  And certainly 
when Congress has provided that such claims may only be 
heard in state courts, and not Federal courts, a court should be 
loath to impute jurisdiction that would confound and run 
contrary to the statutory language Congress has chosen.  See 
Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951) (“The 
jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against 
expansion by judicial interpretation . . . .”).  
 
 Judge Rendell‟s opinion, which relies upon diversity 
jurisdiction to accommodate the plaintiffs‟ claims under the 
TCPA, is flawed.  “Diversity, like all federal jurisdiction, is 
limited in nature . . . .”  Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Rosemount 
Mem‟l Park Ass‟n, 598 F.2d 1303, 1306 (3d Cir. 1979); see 
also, e.g., Loughlin v. United States, 393 F.3d 155, 171 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (“„Because federal courts are of limited 
jurisdiction, there is a presumption against the existence of 
diversity jurisdiction.‟” (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. 
Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1983));  Bank One, Texas, 
N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that 
finding of no jurisdiction “is consistent with the notion that 
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the 
corollary presumption against diversity jurisdiction”); Bishop 
v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 293 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting that 
“artificial creation of diversity” would “run counter to the 
general policy of viewing the federal courts as tribunals of 
limited jurisdiction whose subject matter jurisdiction 
principles should be applied with restraint” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  Thus, diversity 
jurisdiction is not available to parties in lawsuits involving 
federal statutes that specify and provide restrictions and 
requirements for jurisdiction.  Congress, in §227(b)(3), 
provided that all private claims (which would include 
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diversity) be maintained in state courts, not Federal courts.
4
  
There is simply no basis on which a Federal court can 
conclude that its diversity jurisdiction is any less limited than 
other founts of Federal jurisdiction. 
 
 I admire Judge Rendell‟s historical analysis of 
diversity § 1332 jurisdiction.  See Rendell op. at 17-28.  
Unfortunately, however, it has no application here, and is thus 
irrelevant because Congress has decreed that all cases under 
the TCPA are to be brought in state court.  This being so, I 
see no point in discussing the history of diversity jurisdiction. 
 
B. Jurisdiction over TCPA claims is exclusive in the state 
courts. 
 
 Section 227(b)(3) is the only provision of the TCPA 
that addresses the remedy available to a private party who has 
received an unsolicited fax in violation of the statute. 
Congress imposed two key constraints on the availability of a 
forum for such a claim.
5
  
 
 Under Congress‟s explicit language, the cause of 
action must be both (1) “permitted by the laws or rules of 
court of a State” and (2) “[brought] in an appropriate court of 
that State.”  
 
 The only reading of this language that is faithful to 
Congress‟s intent is that a private party may sue only in state 
court.  By referring to a “court of a State” and a “court of that 
                                              
 
4
  In Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 340 (2d 
Cir. 2006), the reasoning and holding of which Judge Rendell 
relies on heavily, the Second Circuit inexplicably deviated 
from established precedent by concluding that “the better 
course” would be to assume that “§ 1332 applies to all causes 
of action, whether created by a state or federal law, unless 
Congress expresses a clear intent to the contrary.”   
 
 
5
 As noted earlier, § 227(b)(3) provides: “A person or 
entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of 
court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State” a 
private claim under the TCPA. 
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State,” Congress was referring to state courts, not to Federal 
courts.  The basic definitions of the word “of” include 
“[d]erived or coming from,” “[b]elonging or connected to,” 
and “issuing from.”  Webster’s II University Dictionary 
(1988).  A court that is “of” a State must, therefore, be one 
whose power is derived from, belongs to, or is issued from, 
the State.   
 
 A Federal court, of course, possesses none of these 
properties; it is, instead, a court whose power is derived from 
the Federal government.  A Federal district court merely 
happens to be located within the geographic boundaries of a 
State, and is not “of” that State.  Thus, the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey cannot be said to be a “court of” 
New Jersey.  Only the state courts of New Jersey satisfy that 
definition.
6
  Hence, when the TCPA uses the words “court of 
that State” plainly and unambiguously, it unmistakably refers 
to a court which is part of a State‟s judicial system -- i.e., a 
state court. 
 
That conclusion is not affected by the statute‟s use of 
the word “may” rather than “shall.”  Although “[t]he word 
„may,‟ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of 
discretion[,] . . . [t]his common-sense principle of statutory 
construction is by no means invariable, . . . and can be 
defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary or 
by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the 
statute.”  United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) 
(citations and footnote omitted).  The plain meaning of this 
                                              
6
  This reading of the statute is consistent with other 
Federal statutes and with case law.  Federal statutes use the 
terms “courts of a State” and “courts of the State” to refer 
exclusively to state courts.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) 
(“An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be 
granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted 
the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . .”); 28 
U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by 
the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, 
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari . 
. . .”).  Indeed, I have discovered no instance in which the 
phrase “court of a State” is used in a context that could 
possibly be read to include Federal courts.   
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term in this context is that a litigant is not required to bring an 
action, but if he chooses to do so, he must comply with 
certain requirements.  Here, the text, purpose, and structure of 
§ 227(b)(3) demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the 
private right of action to state courts, notwithstanding its use 
of the term “may.”  Thus, a claimant need not bring an action 
under the TCPA, but if he chooses to do so, he must bring it 
in state court. 
 
 Moreover, as we said in ErieNet, “[f]or Congress‟ 
reference to state courts to have any meaning,” it must be that 
a private action under the TCPA may be brought only in state 
court.  156 F.3d at 517.  By specifically referring to state 
courts, Congress was directing that those courts be the proper 
forum.  Why else would they, and only they, be mentioned?  
Indeed, while Senator Hollings noted that Congress had not 
“dictated” which state court, Congress was clearly delineating 
state courts, as opposed to the Federal court.   
 
C. Statements of Legislators 
 
 Notwithstanding our observation in ErieNet that 
“Congress referred [TCPA] claims to state court as forcefully 
as it could, given the constitutional difficulties associated 
with Congress‟ mandating a resort to state courts,” 156 F.3d 
at 516 (emphasis added), Judge Rendell and Chief Judge 
McKee now perceive  ambiguity in that same congressional 
directive.  I see no reason to depart from our holding in 
ErieNet that the language of the TCPA is plain and 
unambiguous, and requires a plaintiff‟s claim under the 
TCPA to be brought in a state -- not a Federal -- forum. 
 
 But even if the language were not so plain, it is telling 
that nowhere in the Congressional Record is there any 
implication or contemplation that private enforcement actions 
in the Federal courts were to be countenanced.  Indeed, 
recognizing Sen. Hollings‟ concerns, it is apparent, as I noted 
earlier, that Congress wanted to make it easier for consumers 
to obtain damages from those who violate the bill.  The 
Senator stated: “Small claims court, or a similar court, would 
allow the consumer to appear before the court without an 
attorney.”  137 Cong. Rec. S16204, 16205.  It is obvious to 
me, as it must have been to Sen. Hollings and his colleagues, 
10 
 
that Federal courts do not entertain “small claims,” and that a 
consumer would likely retain counsel if the cause of action 
were to be pursued in Federal court.   
 
 Sen. Hollings was similarly aware of the disturbance 
caused to consumers by unsolicited faxes and telephone calls.  
He referred to patients in hospitals whose treatment might be 
interrupted by unsolicited calls, among others who would be 
the beneficiaries of this amendment.  Accordingly, his 
amendment to the TCPA provided, in the same legislation, 
that any person who has received more than one telephone 
call within any twelve-month period by or on behalf of the 
same entity, in violation of the prescribed regulations, was 
permitted to bring in an appropriate “court of that State” an 
action which could result in $500 in damages, or if the 
violation was willful, an amount not more than $1500.  Both 
the fax and the telephone provisions have amounts 
recoverable as damages in state court only.  These statutory 
damages are far less than any diversity amount established by 
Congress for a Federal court‟s diversity jurisdiction.  
 
D. State Claims (47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(2)) as Distinct from  
Private Claims (47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3))) 
 
 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(2) provides that when a State, as 
distinct from a private claimant, brings an action under the 
TCPA, it must be brought in the Federal courts. 
 
 It is significant that when Sen. Hollings‟ amendment 
turned to the authority of a State to pursue violators, that 
section of the amendment to the TCPA directed that 
jurisdiction was exclusive in the Federal courts.  See 47 
U.S.C. § 227(f)(2).
 7
  It is evident that the Senate was keenly 
                                              
 
7
  Section 227(f)(2) provides: 
 
The district courts of the United 
States, the United States courts of 
any territory, and the District 
Court for the District of Columbia 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
over all civil actions brought 
under this subsection [“Actions by 
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aware of both state and Federal jurisdictions, and had both in 
mind when it sorted them out for defined purposes: A 
consumer‟s private right of action had to be brought in state 
court; a State‟s cause of action had to be brought in Federal 
court. 
 
 What could be plainer or more unambiguous? 
 
E. Sister Courts of Appeals 
 
 I acknowledge that other courts have held that 
diversity jurisdiction may exist notwithstanding the absence 
of federal-question jurisdiction.  See Gene & Gene, LLC v. 
BioPay, LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 325 n.6 (5th Cir. 2008); US Fax 
Law Ctr., Inc. v. iHire, Inc., 476 F.3d 1112, 117-18 (10th Cir. 
2007); Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 340-41; see also Charvat v. 
EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(holding, contra ErieNet and case law in five other circuits, 
that federal-question jurisdiction exists over TCPA claims); 
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 450-51 
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that TCPA suits could be brought in 
Federal court under either § 1331 or § 1332, but noting that 
“if state jurisdiction really is „exclusive,‟ then it knocks out § 
1332 as well as § 1331”).   However, I simply do not find the 
reasoning of these cases persuasive. 
 
                                                                                                     
States”].  Upon proper 
application, such courts shall also 
have jurisdiction to issue writs of 
mandamus, or orders affording 
like relief, commanding the 
defendant to comply with the 
provisions of this section or 
regulations prescribed under this 
section, including the requirement 
that the defendant take such 
action as is necessary to remove 
the danger of such violation.  
Upon a proper showing, a 
permanent or temporary 
injunction or restraining order 
shall be granted without bond. 
12 
 
 For example, in Gottlieb, the case on which Judge 
Rendell seeks to support her diversity theory, the Second 
Circuit acknowledged its own precedent, which, like ErieNet, 
concluded that Federal courts do not have § 1331 jurisdiction 
over TCPA claims.  See Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. 
Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 
1998).  The Second Circuit said, “Our discussion of 
„exclusive jurisdiction‟ in Foxhall must be read in context.  
Foxhall dealt only with federal question jurisdiction; diversity 
jurisdiction was not raised in Foxhall.” Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 
337.  In an accompanying footnote, the court said:  “Our use 
of the word „exclusive‟ in Foxhall meant only that state courts 
have exclusive substance-based jurisdiction over private 
TCPA claims.  Foxhall did not speak to the existence of 
citizenship-based, or diversity, jurisdiction.”  Id. at 337 n.3.  
With Foxhall thus distinguished, the court in Gottlieb went on 
to consider whether § 1332 provided a basis for jurisdiction, 
and concluded that it did, because “there is no clear statement 
of congressional intent to divest the federal courts of diversity 
jurisdiction over TCPA claims.”  Id. at 340-41.   
 
 I am not convinced, and I do not agree.  Each of the 
considerations that led us in ErieNet (and the Second Circuit 
in Foxhall) to conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction is absent -- 
the statutory text‟s reference to state courts, the statement, 
motivation, and reasoning of the bill‟s legislative sponsor, etc. 
-- applies equally to the question of whether diversity 
jurisdiction exists.  It simply does not make sense to say that 
Congress has made state-court jurisdiction “exclusive” with 
respect to one jurisdiction-conferring statute (§ 1331), but not 
the other (§ 1332).   
 
 Our holding in ErieNet that Federal courts lacked 
federal-question § 1331 jurisdiction flowed from our analysis 
that Congress intended to confine private TCPA claimants to 
state court.  Every rationale we relied upon to support that 
conclusion in ErieNet applies with equal force against the 
contention that Federal courts may exercise their diversity 
jurisdiction to hear TCPA claims.
8
   
                                              
8
  Judge Rendell‟s opinion maintains that aggregation 
of small claims for purposes of diversity jurisdiction assuages 
any concern that small claims could worm their way into 
13 
 
 
F.     Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
 
 Nor am I persuaded to change my view because of the 
fact that the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was enacted 
later in time than the TCPA.  As I understand it, the argument 
is that since CAFA was enacted in 2005, fourteen years after 
the TCPA was enacted in 1991, and since CAFA is a 
jurisdiction-conferring statute, it created Federal jurisdiction 
over claims brought under TCPA, even if the Federal courts 
would have lacked jurisdiction to hear them before CAFA 
became effective.  I believe that it reads too much into CAFA 
to conclude that it creates jurisdiction over particular causes 
of action that Congress had earlier decided to exclude from 
Federal jurisdiction.   
 
 CAFA was enacted to expand Federal jurisdiction over 
class actions involving classes with certain characteristics 
(e.g., only minimal diversity) that would have precluded 
Federal jurisdiction pre-CAFA.  CAFA could not, and did 
not, confer jurisdiction over particular causes of action that 
Congress had previously withdrawn from the Federal courts.  
It is for Congress and only Congress, not the courts, to decide 
whether TCPA should be amended to allow claims to be 
heard in the Federal courts.  Cf. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212 
(“Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases 
the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.”).  The courts 
of the Third Branch should not, and cannot, amend 
Congress‟s legislation to accord with a court‟s view.  It is not 
a judicial function to enact legislation, or to repeal or amend 
legislation by court decree.  That function -- the legislative 
function -- has been assigned by the Constitution to the 
Congress -- not the courts.  
                                                                                                     
Federal court.  See Rendell op. at 33-35, 39-40.  But we are 
not concerned with whether diversity jurisdiction over TCPA 
claims makes sense as a matter of policy; rather, our task is to 
hew as closely as possible to the intent of Congress, as 
evidenced by the statutory terms its has chosen.  See infra 
Section III.F.   
 
14 
 
IV. 
 
 I therefore respectfully dissent from the opinions of 
Judge Rendell and Chief Judge McKee.  I would hold that 
Federal courts lack all jurisdiction -- under either § 1331 or § 
1332 -- to adjudicate claims asserted under 47 U.S.C. § 
227(b)(3).  I would therefore affirm the District Court‟s 
decisions on the basis that no jurisdiction existed to entertain 
the various plaintiffs‟ claims.  Thus, I do not address the 
issues that the majority opinion has discussed pertaining to 
class actions and Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (2010).   
